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One centimeter over my back yard: where does federal
preemption of state drone regulation start?
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.1
Albert J. Plawinski
I.

Introduction

You look out your back window and see a small drone hovering a few inches over your
lawn, driving your dog crazy, and watching you watching it. Do you have to figure out
how to report it to the Federal Aviation Administration and wait for the FAA to send an
inspector, or should you call the cops?
Since the United States Constitution was ratified, creating a paradigmatic federal
structure for governing the United States, new technologies have consistently raised
new issues about the allocation of governing responsibility between the central
government and the sovereign states that ceded some of their sovereignty to create the
United States of America. Steamboats, factories, railroads, telegraphs and telephones,
motor cars, wireless communications, aircraft, the Internet, and biotechnology each
have raised questions anew about whether a more or less uniform body of national law,
or a mosaic of different state and local laws would advance social welfare the most.
Now, the proliferation of commercial drones (unmanned aircraft systems) reignites old
controversies over state and federal power. Being sold by the thousands by Amazon
and other online vendors, flown for fun by hobbyists and to make money in a variety of
industries, drones alarm privacy advocates, enrage anti-government zealots, make
pilots fearful of midair collisions, and invite intervention by politically ambitious office
Professor of Law and former Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law, the law school of Illinois Institute of
Technology. Private airplane and helicopter pilot. S.B. in Aeronautics and Astronautics, MIT; S.M. in
Management, MIT Sloan School; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. Formerly applications
engineer and senior sales planner, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation; consultant to Administrative
Conference of the United States on FAA and NTSB civil penalty procedures. Member of the bar:, Virginia
(inactive), Pennsylvania (inactive), District of Columbia, Maryland, Illinois, Supreme Court of the United
States. Mr. Perritt represents several private clients seeking section 333 exemptions from the FAA. He
appreciates the stellar work of his research assistant, Albert J. Plawinski, Chicago-Kent College of Law
Class of 2017, in fleshing out major parts of this article.
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holders and aspirants. At the same time, drones excite the entrepreneurial energies of
private sector technology enthusiasts who have applied by the hundreds for
governmental permission to operate them commercially, and who forecast hundreds of
thousands of new jobs and billions in economic growth.
Drone regulation is inevitable. Drones, like other flying objects, can be dangerous.
Airplanes and helicopters are quite safe statistically, but even they occasionally destroy
things and kill people. Helicopters and airplanes operate safely most of the time in a
century-old web of customary practices and federal regulation. The FAA sets standards
for the aircraft, the pilots that fly them, and the procedures of businesses that operate
them. That traditional legal framework is ill-suited to drones. The balances struck
between safety and economic productivity for airplanes carrying passengers and
helicopters performing med-evac missions cannot merely be extended to much smaller
air vehicles with no one on board.
The author and his frequent co-author, Eliot O. Sprague, have been active in exploring
the ingredients of sound drone regulation in other articles, published over the last
couple of years.2 Those articles assume, for the most part, that whatever regulation
emerges will be federal, with drone-operator (“DROP”) behavior also being conditioned
by restrictions imposed by private liability insurers and the prospect of tort liability for
negligent operation.
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Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Drones, 17 VANDERBILT J. ENT. & TECH. L. 101 (2015); Henry H. Perritt,
Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 385 (2015); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. &
Eliot O. Sprague, Developing DROP Discipline: Training and Testing Operators of Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 143 (2015); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Drones for hire, DRONESX, May 27,
2015; Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Bracing for Impact, VERTICAL, April/May 2015, at p.86; Henry H.
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PRO, July, 2014; Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law and Order in the Skies, THE TECH (MIT student
newspaper), 13 June 2014; Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, But Who’s Going to Fly Them? PROFESSIONAL
PILOT, June, 2014, p.94; Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Drone Dread, ROTOR & WING MAGAZINE, June,
2014, p.34; Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Is there a drone in your future? HELIWEB, May, 2014 p. 14.
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This is the fourth in a series of articles about civilian drones – what the FAA calls “small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“sUAS”). The first article3 explores the subject generally,
introducing the important distinction between microdrones and machodrones and
focusing on the engineering choices that are made that produce actual designs of
aircraft in these distinct markets. The second article4 focuses more closely on vehicle
design and explains that most of the rules contemplated by the FAA to ensure safe
operation can be built into onboard systems. If drones may be sold only when they
internalize aviation safety rules, the burden of enforcing traditional rules on hundreds
of thousands of operators is eased considerably. The third article5 focuses on human
capital. It proposes that bureaucratic burdens can be eased by delegating much of the
responsibility for drone operator (“DROP”) training and certification to private
organizations, extending the model traditionally used for civilian pilots in the United
States.
This article focuses on the allocation of responsibility among different levels of
government, recognizing that much civilian drone commercial activity will take place
close to the ground and within greatly circumscribed horizontal ranges – matters
traditionally regulated by states and municipalities rather than by the federal
government.
This article provides a framework within which an intergovernmental tug of war
among federal aviation regulators, states, and municipalities can be addressed. Part II
explains what drones are, emphasizing the distinctions between microdrones and
machodrones. Microdrones, mostly multicopters in configuration, cost from a few
hundred to a few thousand dollars, and have limited endurance and range. Mostly
powered by electric motors and batteries, they are capable of flying for 15 minutes to an
hour, at distances ranging up to a mile or so from the operator, at a few hundred feet
above the ground. They can carry high-quality cameras and other sensors, and may
eventually be able to deliver small packages. They cannot transport any practical
quantity of freight, any significant weaponry, or carry people. They represent scaled up
versions of model aircraft—or model aircraft themselves, put to new uses.
3
4
5

Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Drones, 17 VANDERBILT J. ENT. & TECH. L. 101 (2015).
Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 385 (2015).
Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Developing DROP Discipline: Training and Testing Operators of Small

Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L. J. 143 (2015).
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Machodrones are bigger. More likely to be configured as fixed-wing aircraft or
conventional helicopters, they often have gasoline, diesel, or turbine engines and much
larger payloads. They can perform essentially the same missions as manned airplanes
and helicopters and extend them, because they are not constrained by the endurance of
on-board crew members. They represent scaled down versions of airplanes, helicopters,
and military drones used in combat and for intelligence collection.
Microdrones present only modest risks to other aircraft and to people and property on
the ground; machodrones present greater risk because of their weight and range.
Part II concludes with an overview of emerging drone regulation, haltingly initiated by
the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) in late 2014.
Part III reviews the constitutional pillars of federalism: the Commerce Clause and the
Supremacy Clause; and analyzes the many cases adjudicating the boundary between
federal and state regulation of older aviation technologies.
Part IV takes the preemption doctrines developed in Part III and synthesizes a set of
legal principles that enable, while circumscribing, state and municipal regulation of
drones. It considers a number of specific restrictions that might be contemplated and
evaluates their likely prospects for surviving preemption challenges.
Part V recognizes that the eventual allocation of responsibility for regulating drones
will be driven as much by politics as by the law. It sketches the likely political dynamics
in light of mass public concerns and interest group alignments. It considers the damage
that might result from a completely uninhibited and fragmented exercise of
governmental power at the most local level, explores state-municipal allocation of
responsibility and federal-state cooperative possibilities.
The final part provides a framework within which both the federal government and
states and their subdivisions can exercise traditional powers to regulate different
aspects of all kinds of drones. The enormous popularity of microdrones has given rise
to a new category of operations, increasingly referred to "consumer drones." Consumer
drones do not fit comfortably within either traditional model-aircraft operations or the
commercial microdrone flights the FAA proposes to regulate in its NPRM and has
accommodated with its nearly 700 section 333 exemptions. Consumer drone operations
represent a greater threat to aviation safety and the safety of people and things on the
4

ground than model aircraft or commercial microdrones, but the 2012 Act prohibits the
FAA from regulating them. Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced a bill, S.1608, in 20156
that would address the problem, but it may be that the best solution is to leave
consumer drones for state and local regulation. Section XXX considers that possibility.

II.

Drones

Any regulatory initiatives, whether federal, state, or local, should proceed from a solid
understanding of the technology to be regulated. More important, it should focus on
actual, rather than imagined, risks posed by the technology, qualified as much as
possible. In other words, risk-based regulation should be the norm. Drone regulation
also should impose performance standards rather than detailed engineering standards,7
which freeze technology at a particular point in time and discourage innovation.
Finally, the burdens of any particular regulatory approach should be weighed against
the benefit it produces to the public interest. All regulation necessarily excludes some
low-probability risks with modest costs, when the burden of eliminating them is too
high.8 The FAA has embraced all three of these principles in its NPRM,9 in its approach
to the section 333 process.

A.

Two weight groups

Drone technologies are embedded in two distinct groups of vehicles: microdrones,
machodrones. The boundary between the two other groups is statutorily defined;
anything weighing more than 55 pounds is a machodrone. But the range from 0 to 55

S.1608, Consumer Drone Safety Act, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Jun. 18, 2015).
See Statement by Ms Feinstein, 161 Cong. Rec. S4300 (June 18, 2015) [hereinafter
“S.1608”].
9 FAA, Operation and certification of small unmanned aircraft systems; proposed rule,
80 Fed. Reg. 9544, 9552, 9561 (Feb. 23, 2015) (referring to risk-based and performancebased approach).
9 FAA, Operation and certification of small unmanned aircraft systems; proposed rule,
80 Fed. Reg. 9544, 9552, 9561 (Feb. 23, 2015) (referring to risk-based and performancebased approach).
9 FAA, Operation and certification of small unmanned aircraft systems; proposed rule,
80 Fed. Reg. 9544, 9552, 9561 (Feb. 23, 2015) (referring to risk-based and performancebased approach).
6
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pounds is too large; a 5-pound 3Drobotics Solo presents vastly different risks from a 50pound aircraft. An appropriate boundary between small microdrones and big ones—
which might be called “mididrones” has not been defined, however. Maybe it should be
the 3 kilogram/4.3 pounds that the UAS America Fund proposed for a special
regulatory category known as micro sUAS,10 a proposal on which the FAA explicitly
invited comment in the NPRM.11 Maybe it should be 8 pounds or 20 pounds. The most
popular small drones include the various DJI Phantom models which fit comfortably
below the lowest number, but they also include the DJI Inspire 1, the 3Drobotics IRIS+,
the DJI Spreading Wings S800, S900 and S1000, the FreeFly Cinestar 8, and many
others.12
The vehicles most commonly approved in the section 333 exemptions almost all would
be accommodated by 20 pound limit; and most would be accommodated by an 8 pound
limit. The 4.3 pound limit would exclude everything except the DJI Phantoms.
Regardless of the regulatory categories and the dividing line between microdrones and
mididrones, vehicles falling in the microdrone and mididrone groups share many basic
characteristics. They are multicopters, typically quadcopters for the smaller products,
Petition of UAS America Fund, LLC (“UAS Fund”) to Adopt 14 C.F.R. Part 107 to
Implement Operational Requirements for Micro Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
http://www.uasamericafund.com/assets/uas-america-fund-petition-rulemaking.pdf
(filed Dec. 18, 2014).
11 NPRM, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9556-9557 (inviting comment on micro-sUAS idea).
10

12

The most popular microdrone is the DJI Phantom, which comes in various models with prices

clustered around $1,000. Options include a built-in gimbaled camera or a gimbal for a GoPro camera. The
DJI Phantom, http://www.dji.com/product/phantom, is a quadcopter, with a diagonal size of 14 inches. It
has a maximum gross weight of 2.6 pounts. A close competitor is the 3drobotics Solo,
http://3drobotics.com/solo-gopro-drone-specs/, also a quadcopter, with a diagonal size of 23 inches. It has
a maximum gross weight of 3.3 pounds.
Larger vehicles in the microdrone category include the SJI S1000, http://www.dji.com/product/spreadingwings-s1000/spec, an octocopter, with a diagonal size of 48 inches and maximum gross weight of 24
pounds, and the similarly sized Cinestar 8. See http://freeflysystems.com/products/cinestar/8/. All of them
have maximum endurance of about 20 minutes and autonomous flight control and navigation features,
including automatic hover, automatic return to home, and the ability to fly among pre-programmed
waypoints. The smaller ones carry GoPro-sized cameras on 2- or 3-axis gimbals with the ability to
downlink video. The larger ones can carry larger camera packages up to and including the Red camera
used by professional cinematographers, and more sophisticated gimbals.
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and hexacopters or octocopters for the bigger ones.13 They all have electrical propulsion
systems in which LiPo batteries drive a motor on each rotor. They all have sophisticated
electronic control systems that adjust vehicle attitude and orientation by varying rotor
RPM differentially, obviating the need for most of the mechanical complexity on
helicopters.
They all have magnetometers (electronic magnetic compasses), altimeters, and GPS
navigation. Most of them have autonomous safety features, usually including automatic
take off, landing, and hover; automatic return to home at the command of the DROP or
if the control link is interrupted; and geo- fencing, which keeps the drone within a
certain distance of the DROP, below a certain altitude, and excludes it from airports and
other controlled airspace. Most of them can autonomously fly a flight plan defined in
advance by entering waypoints, and modifiable in flight.
Few micro- and mididrones have endurance greater than 30 minutes, and most are in
the 15-20 minute range. With maximum speeds of about 35 knots, their theoretical
range is 10-20 miles, but the spread-spectrum WiFi technologies used for their control
links limit them to less than a mile, as a practical matter. They have enough thrust to fly
up to several thousand feet above sea level.
Enough similarities exist among the most popular models that the analysis can proceed
under the statutory bifurcation between microdrones and machodrones, recognizing
that a new middle-category may emerge.14
Machodrones design will not crystallize until users gain more experience with widely
varying configurations. Only a few have entered the market. They are, by definition,
heavier, approaching the weight of small airplanes and helicopters. They are more
likely to have gasoline, diesel, or turboshaft propulsion systems to allow greater
endurance and range than is available from the smaller vehicles. To justify their cost,
they will have to fly beyond line of sight and at altitudes that will cause them to
intermingle with manned aircraft. It is far from clear whether their capabilities will

The article ignores altogether toy drones, those costing less than $100, weighing only an ounce or two
and intended mainly to be flown inside.
14 The article ignores altogether toy drones, those costing less than $100, weighing only an ounce or two
and intended mainly to be flown inside.
14

7

justify their higher cost, comparable to, or exceeding that of airplanes and helicopters in
similar weight classes.

B.

Benefits

The explosion of interest in civilian drones, accelerated by CBS 60 Minutes reporter
Charlie Rose’s November, 2013 interview with Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos, is fueled by an
appreciation of their utility. Microdrones and mididrones can make aviation support –
especially aerial imagery – available where it has not been available before due to cost
or risk of using manned aircraft. Microdrones and mididrones have acquisition costs
two- to three orders of magnitude less than helicopters and airplanes. Their operating
costs are similarly lower, although crew costs may turn out to be comparable, if DROP
compensation resembles that for pilots – the labor market for DROPs is in its infancy.
The limited payload capability of the smaller drones means that they are primarily
useful for aerial imaging. But aerial imaging applications abound. Event photography;
aerial photographs and videos for marketing of real estate and boats; inspection of
utility infrastructure such as pipelines, powerlines, and railroads; aerial inspection of
bridges; traffic and breaking news coverage for television; assessing the damage from
natural disasters; motion picture and television production; and precision agriculture
resulting from crop inspection are applications that have provided incentives for more
than 1,000 individuals and business entities to apply for section 333 exemptions, more
than 700 of which have been granted, at the rate of 50 or so per week, as of this writing.
Further in the future, drones may be able to deliver packages and disaster relief
supplies.
Drone proponents project creation of 100,000 jobs and $82 billion in contributions to
economic growth.15 While this is likely overblown, the potential contribution to
economic growth and employment is undoubtedly substantial.

C.

Risks

Microdrones and mididrones are lightweight, compared to helicopters and airplanes.
That means that the kinetic energy to be absorbed in a crash is minuscule compared to
http://www.auvsi.org/econreport; See also See Marcelo Ballvé, The Drones Report: Market
Forecasts For Commercial Applications, Regulatory Process, And Leading Players (Feb. 26, 2015) (BI
Intelligence) (forecasting $13 billion in annual spending by 2024, up from $6 billion in 2014).
15
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that of a traditional manned aircraft crash. They also do not carry fuel and thus present
de-minimis fire risk. Finally, they do not carry people, so the risks to aircrews and
passengers that drive so much of traditional aviation regulation is absent from the
equation.
Drone operation is not without risk, however. Even a Phantom can cut someone badly if
it encounters her while its blades are turning. It can create a panic if it lands or appears
about to land in the middle of a crowd. A DJI Phantom weighs about as much as a
pigeon, and Cinestar 8 weighs about as much as a goose. The damage they could do
helicopter bubbles (windshields) and airplane engines is probably similar to that
resulting from bird strikes,16 the resistance to which is tested extensively before any
airplane or helicopter receives an airworthiness and type certificate. 17
They also can create risk by distracting people performing potentially dangerous
activities, like driving down expressways. Almost any driver would be inclined to
swerve and apply the brakes if she suddenly sees even a small drone like a DJI Phantom
in front of and a few feet above her in the express lanes.
Microdrone navigation systems and control links are notoriously unreliable,
undermining the integrity of their autonomous safety features. Flyaways are not
uncommon—a situation in which the drone ignores DROP commands and ascends
beyond desired heights or flies beyond programmed or commanded distances from the
DROP.18
Machodrones create far greater risk—similar to or greater than manned aircraft. Their
higher weights give them greater kinetic energy, which must be dissipated in a crash.
They are more likely to carry inflammable fuel. Their occupancy of higher levels of
airspace magnifies the risk of mid-air collisions. The fact that their DROPs are on the
ground makes it more difficult for them to honor the see-and-avoid principle that is the
mainstay of traditional flight rules.

The large LiPo batteries and metal structural components on microdrones, however, absorb energy
differently from bird bodies, and therefore testing beyond birds is necessary.
17 14 C.F.R. § 33.76 (bird-strike test requirements).
19 FAA, Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689 (Feb. 13, 2007).
16
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D.

Regulatory approaches

The FAA has been studying civilian drones at least since 2007. In that year it published
a Federal Register notice on drones,19 describing a process for obtaining approval for
civilian flight through special airworthiness certificates-experimental. The process was
extremely cumbersome and mandated data submissions borrowed irrationally from the
requirements for experimental airplanes and helicopters. Until 2012, the agency relied
mostly on its slow moving advisory committee process20 to tell it how to proceed.
In 2012 Congress enacted the 2012 FAA Reauthorization and Revitalization Act,21 which
contained several explicit sections requiring the FAA to move faster and ultimately to
integrate civilian drones into the National Airspace System. It required the FAA to
come up with “Comprehensive Plan” and a “Roadmap,”22 to issue proposed rules and
then to finalize them,23 and to follow an incremental approach allowing lower risk
drones to be flown commercially while more complex issues relating to high-risk,
heavier drawings were being worked out.24 It also authorized, in section 333, interim
procedures that would allow commercial drone flight in specific cases even before the
FAA developed more general regulations.25
The FAA issued the required Comprehensive Plan26 and Roadmap in 2013,27 published
a notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) for microdrones and mididrones in early
2015,28 and began a section 333 exemption process in late 2014,29 which resulted, by mid-

19

FAA, Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689 (Feb. 13, 2007).

See Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC),
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm
/committee/browse/committeeID/1. The most recent posting of the Unmanned
Aerospace Vehicles (UAV) Operations Working Group (WG) is dated 1991.
21 Pub. L. 112-95, 112th Cong. (Feb. 14, 2012) [hereinafter “2012 Act”].
22 2012 Act § 332(a) (1) (comprehensive plan); Id. § 332(a)(5) (roadmap) .
23 2012 Act § 332(b).
24 2012 Act § 332(b).
20

25

2012 Act § 333.

26

http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agi/reports/media/uas_comprehensive_plan.p
df.
27
28

http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf.
80 Fed. Reg. 9544 (Feb. 23, 2015).
10

2015, in the grant of more than 700 section 333 exemptions.30 Pursuant to another
statutory command,31 the FAA established six test ranges around the country.32 They
were slow to take off because of needlessly cumbersome application and approval
requirements initially imposed for every drone flight on the test ranges, and because of
initial FAA reluctance to give guidance on the research and demonstration activities
that would be most relevant to its regulatory development.33 Under considerable
congressional pressure, the FAA began, in early 2015, to allow the test ranges to become
more useful, by steering drone demonstration and experimentation activities to the test
centers and by articulating more clearly the data needs for regulatory action.
The agency also has entered into a handful of cooperative ventures with industry to
facilitate technology development that would enable broader use of machodrones,
especially technologies that would provide collision avoidance through automated
sense-and-avoid systems.34 NASA has undertaken a cooperative research effort to
accelerate this technology development.35
The content of the NPRM and of the section 333 exemptions defines a regulatory
approach that essentially imposes the non-binding guidelines for model aircraft flight:
https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/; See FAA, Astraeus
Aerial - Exemption Rulemaking, FAA-2014-0352,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2014-0352 (Sep. 25, 2014).
30 https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section_333/ (summarizing number of
exemptions granted).
31 2012 Act § 332(c) (requiring establishment of “pilot projects”).
32 https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/test_sites/ (announcing test sites).
33 GAO, Unmanned Aerial Systems: Efforts Made toward Integration into the National
Airspace Continue, but Many Actions Still Required (Dec. 10, 2014),
http://gao.gov/assets/670/667346.pdf; DOT, Office of Inspector General, FAA Faces
Significant Barriers to Safely Integrate Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National
Airspace System, Report Number: AV-2014-061 (June 26, 2014),
www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Oversight%20of%20Unmanned%20Aircraf
t%20Systems%5E6-26-14.pdf.
29

FAA, Press Release – FAA-Industry Initiative Will Expand Small UAS Horizons,
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=18756 (May 6, 2015) (announcing
34

Pathfinder project).
35 NASA Armstrong Fact Sheet: Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration in the National Airspace System
(Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.nasa.gov/centers/armstrong/news/FactSheets/FS-075-DFRC.html.
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weight limits, restricted height (below five hundred feet), operations only with in the
line of sight of the operator, avoidance of manned aircraft, exclusion of drone flights
from airports and other controlled airspace, careful pre flight inspection, conformity to
manufacturer instructions, operations only over property as to which an operator has
permission, and qualification requirements for DROPs.36
The greatest controversies involve requirements, consistently imposed in the section 333
exceptions, that DROPs have pilot licenses, that DROPs maintain visual contact as
opposed to video aided (first person view or “FPV”) control, and the exclusion of night
flights and operation from moving vehicles. The proposed rule eliminates the
requirement for a traditional pilot’s license, and substitutes a new airman certificate
called "sUAS operator," which can be acquired by passing a knowledge test tailored to
drone operation instead of manned aircraft flight. 37 In light of comments received on
DROP qualification, the final rule is likely to add an experience requirement and a flight
test to the drone qualification requirements.
The higher risks associated with machodrone flight justify the FAA’s incremental
approach. Beyond line of sight operations at higher altitudes are likely to await the
results of research and development on new technologies for collision avoidance.
International competitiveness adds to the pressure to get an appropriate regulatory
regime in place to realize the potential. Canada, particularly, has moved much more
quickly than the United States to provide flexible regulations allowing low risk
commercial drone operations.38Amazon stresses in Congressional hearings and other
public forums that it had to go overseas to conduct research and do demonstrations of
package delivery by drones. Without prompt FAA action to get rules in place, drone
design and manufacture are likely to move offshore.
General rules proposed in the NPRM are unlikely to be in place before 2016 or 2017.
Meanwhile, the hundreds of section 333 exemption holders are beginning to fly
commercially.

NPRM §§ 107.11-107.11, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9586-9588 (proposed operating rules); FAA Exemption No.
11310, Docket No. FAA 2014-0608 (Colin Hinkle) at 5-9 (imposing operating limitations).
37 80 Fed. Reg. at 9567-9574 (discussing UAS operator rating).
38 See NPRM at 9557 (table comparing Canadian microdrone rules with those proposed in NPRM).
36
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In addition, hundreds, maybe thousands, of others are flying drones for pleasure or
commercially in ignorance or defiance of the FAA's regulatory regime. This is the most
serious public safety threat. The FAA has brought no enforcement proceedings for
illegal commercial flight,39 and its resources will never permit comprehensive
enforcement against drone outlaws. Supplementing FAA resources by state and local
law-enforcement resources might help, but if legal restrictions are too far out of line
with what is possible and safe, noncompliance will become an even greater problem,
exceeding the enforcement resources of all levels of government.
Increasingly state and municipal policymakers ask if they can do the regulatory job
themselves. The answer to that question depends on whether state and local regulation
of this new type of aviation activity is preempted by federal law.

III.

Constitutional framework
A.

The Commerce Clause

Article One of the United States Constitution gives the Congress of United States the
power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states . . . ."40
Known as the "Commerce Clause," this is both a grant of federal legislative power and a
limitation on the states. The states may not, consistent with the "dormant commerce
clause" regulate intrastate commerce so as to interfere with interstate commerce.41

John Goglia, FAA Says Commercial Drone Operators Need Exemption. But Doesn't
Prosecute Those Flying Without One, Forbes, Feb. 13, 2015,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoglia/2015/02/13/faa-says-commercial-droneoperators-need-exemption-but-doesnt-prosecute-those-flying-without-one/ (reporting
that FAA policy provides "that legal enforcement action is to be taken only for 'a
violation that poses a medium or high actual or potential risk to safety,' such as 'when a
UAS operation has a medium or high risk of endangering the operation of another
aircraft or endangering persons or property on the ground.'”).
40 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8.
41 Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1986) (explaining
dormant commerce clause analysis and holding that state tax on aviation fuel did not
interfere with foreign commerce with Canada).
39
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"Interstate commerce" has been given a very broad read so as to encompass commercial
activities that have effects on interstate commerce as well as those that directly involve
intercourse among the states.42 It is likely, for example, that sale and distribution of even
the smallest toy drone affects interstate commerce, because they are sold by mostly by
online vendors to anyone able to make contact with their websites, regardless of where
they are located.
In two recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the United
States Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause is not unlimited. In United States v.
Morrison,43 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal statute that provided a
civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence because it exceeded the
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
The Court reiterated, from Lopez, (see infra) three categories of activity that fall within
the commerce power:
1. channels of interstate commerce;
2. instrumentalities, persons, or things in interstate commerce, and
3. activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.44
The Court focused on the third category, activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.45 It noted that federal regulation of intrastate economic or commercial
activity has usually been held to be within the commerce power.46
Because the violence addressed by the statute was not commercial in character, the
Court found it outside the commerce power.

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding application of NLRA
to local steel production labor relations to be within federal authority under Commerce
Clause because of indirect effects on interstate commerce). "Although activities may be
intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate
to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions," 301 U.S. at 36.
42

43
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46

529 U.S. 598 (2000),
529 U.S. at 608-609.
529 U.S. at 609.
Id. at 612.
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The Morrison Court relied heavily on United States v. Lopez,47 in which the Court held
that a federal statute criminalizing possession of firearms near schools exceeded the
commerce power. In reviewing the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the
Lopez court noted Wickard v. Filburn,48 which held that the commerce power extended to
homegrown wheat because of its economic effect on the national market for wheat. But
"neither here nor in Wickard has the Court declared that Congress may use a relatively
trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private
activities." 49
"We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case law, that the proper test
requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity “substantially affects” interstate
commerce." 50
The Lopez court rejected the argument that gun violence might have an effect on
interstate commerce:
"The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity
that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no
indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no
requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate
commerce.
“To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference
upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States. "51
The Morrison and Lopez cases involved constitutional challenges to statutes, not to
administrative-agency regulations or orders. The limitations imposed by the Court in
those cases, however, apply to agency actions. Administrative agencies have no power

47
48
49
50
51

514 U.S. 549 (1995),
317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942),
Lopez at 558 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)).
Id. at 559.
Id. at 567.
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not validly delegated to them by statute. A statute purporting to delegate a power the
Congress does not have is a legal nullity. So if a federal agency attempts to regulate an
activity outside the Congress’s commerce power, the agency action is unconstitutional,
just as a statute directly regulating the same activity would be.
Morrison and Lopez support an argument that federal power over drones is limited. For
commercial activity that does not fall within the commerce power, per se; the federal
regulator must demonstrate a substantial relationship to interstate commerce. Merely
because an activity is commercial does not mean that it is within the commerce power.
To be within the commerce power, local commerce must affect interstate commerce.
The same touchstones for evaluating effects are expressed in the Lopez and Morrison
cases; only the level of scrutiny is different.
Federal restrictions on the kinds of drones that may be sold would involve interstate
commerce; regulation of localized drone flight at low levels above the ground does not.
Localized flight does not involve commerce that crosses state lines; it usually involves
activity within the scope of no more than a mile. Any safety hazards are local—to
persons or property nearby. Safety hazards to airliners carrying interstate passengers or
freight are minimal, given the autonomous limitations installed on the vehicle’s control
systems that keep them away from where most commercial manned aircraft fly.

B.

The Supremacy Clause

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,52 nullifies state law that
conflicts with federal law. Such conflict may arise when the United States Congress
expressly forecloses state law in a statute (express preemption), when a state law or
regulation directly conflicts with federal law (conflict preemption), or when the
pervasiveness of federal regulation leaves no room for state regulation (field
preemption).
Usually a presumption against preemption operates, but not with respect to aviation
safety regulation.
"[T]he presumption against preemption only arises if Congress legislates in a
field traditionally occupied by the states. In matters of air transportation, the

52

U.S. Const, Art. VI,
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federal presence is both longstanding and pervasive; that field is simply not one
traditionally reserved to the states. The Supreme Court has not suggested that
the presumption against preemption should be interposed in that field.53
1.
Express preemption
In Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines,54 the court of appeals found no general express preemption
in the Federal Aviation Act,55 distinguishing express preemption under the Airline
Deregulation Act:
“A State ... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having
the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any air carrier
that may provide air transportation under this subpart.”56
49 U.S.C. § 40103 declares that "[t]he United States Government has exclusive
sovereignty of airspace of the United States." This provision has been interpreted,
however, as addressing sovereignty vis-a-vis other countries rather than the federalstate relationship.57
2.
Implied preemption
Montalvo explains two types of implied preemption: field preemption and conflict
preemption.
a)
Conflict preemption
“Courts may find conflict preemption when a state law actually conflicts with federal
law or when a state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress in enacting the federal law.”58
In some hypothetical instances, conflict preemption would be obvious. If the FAA
mandates practice autorotations as a part of helicopter training, and a state prohibits

Brown v. United Airlines, Inc., 720 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that state common-law claims by
skycaps for a share of an airline fee for curbside checking of baggage was preempted by the explicit
preemption language in the Airline Deregulation Act).
54 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007).
55 508 F.3d at 470.
56 508 F.3d at 474-475, quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
57 CITE
58 508 F.3d at 470.
53
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practice autorotations because of the high incidence of accidents associated with such
flight training, the conflict is manifest, and the state provision must yield.
Conflict preemption can be difficult to distinguish from field preemption. Suppose, for
example, that an FAA regulation prescribes certain content for passenger briefings on
commercial flights, and a state decides to impose an additional requirement that the
briefing include advice that sitting for long periods of time can produce deep vein
thrombosis. The state measure is preempted, either because the FAA has occupied the
field of passenger briefing, or because adding to the FAA mandated briefing subjects
conflicts with the scheme for passenger briefing the FAA envisions. In other words, the
FAA prescription of certain content implies that briefer should talk about nothing else
in the briefing.
b)
Field preemption
Field preemption exists when federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field “as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it."59
As § III.A explains, preemption cannot extend beyond the Commerce power.

C.

Aviation preemption

Some three dozen reported state and federal cases address federal preemption in the
field of aviation safety.60 Some of them contain sweeping language concluding that the
entire field of aviation safety is off-limits to state and local law. In Abdullah v. American
Airlines, Inc.,61 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that state
regulation of aviation safety is federally preempted.62 "[W]e find implied federal
preemption of the entire field of aviation safety." 63 The case involved a state law claim
for damages occasioned by operation of an airline transport in turbulence.
State regulation can, of course, take either one of two forms. It can be statutory,
criminalizing certain drone-related conduct and imposing fines or giving authority to
508 F.3d at 470.
A Westlaw search on 13 June 2015 with the search terms sy,di("aviation safety" & preemp!) yielded 36
cases.
61 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
62 181 F.3d at 365.
63 181 F.3d at 365.
59
60
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state or local administrative agencies to promulgate rules and impose civil penalties for
their violation. Alternatively, the state common-law can give individuals a private right
of action for certain drone-related conduct, such as that causing injury or damage or
invading personal privacy property rights. Preemption caselaw discussed in this part
involves both types of approach.
In In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center, New York,64 the district court assigned multiple
cases involving a Colgan Airways crash held that occupation of the field of aviation
safety by the Federal Aviation Act leaves no room for state safety standards. "Applying
state law standards of care would interfere with these regulations and potentially
subject airlines and related entities to 50 different standards."65
Other cases, however, adopt a more nuanced approach, examining whether the FAA
has regulated particular subject matter, the degree of conflict between federal and state
rules on the subject, and whether the matter regulated by the state involves a subject
within traditional state police powers.
In early 2014, the FAA said: “[A] state law or regulation that prohibits or limits the
operation of an aircraft, sets standards for airworthiness, or establishes pilot
requirements generally would be preempted.“66
a)
Aircrew qualification
State prescription of qualifications for flight personnel is preempted, because of the
FAA’s extensive regulation of the subject. In French v. Pan Am Express, Inc.,67 the First
Circuit held that state regulation of drug tests for pilots was preempted, because it
intruded on the field of pilot qualifications, a matter regulated in detail by the FAA.68
In Ventress v. Japan Airlines,69 the court of appeals affirmed the district court's conclusion
that state employment claims by a flight engineer were preempted. The plaintiff's
whistleblower claims would have drawn the state court into deciding "backdoor

798 F. Supp.2d 481 (W.D. N.Y. 2011).
798 F. Supp.2d at 486.
66 FAA, Fact Sheet – Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS),
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=14153 (Jan. 6, 2014).
67 869 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
68 869 F.2d at 4.
69 747 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2014).
64
65
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challenges to JAL's safety-related decisions regarding his and Captain Bicknell's
physical and mental fitness to operate civil aircraft."70 "Permitting indirect challenges to
aviation safety decisions under the guise of state law whistleblower claims interferes
with the agency's authority to serve as the principal arbiter of aviation safety," it said. 71
The court was careful to point out, however, that not all state employment law in the
airline employment context is preempted, only those state claims that "encroach upon,
supplement, or alter the federally occupied field of aviation safety" and jeopardize
national uniformity.72
The court distinguished Martin v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc.73 which found that state
standards of care for airplane stairs were not preempted because the FARs established
no requirements for airplane stairs.74
b)
Aircraft design
Many cases finding no preemption involve products liability actions premised on
claims of negligent design. Public Health Trust of Dade County, Fla. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc.75 is
an example. The plaintiff was injured in a seaplane accident and claimed that his seat
was negligently designed. The court of appeals reversed summary judgment for the
defendant, finding that, despite FAA standards for seat design, allowing a damages
action to proceed did not interfere with federal regulation.76
Damages for personal injuries can co-exist with federal aviation safety regulations.77
State regulation prescribing flight rules or aircraft design cannot. In Lewis v. Lycoming,78
the district court interpreted Abdullah and Elassaad to hold that state products liability
claims are not preempted on field preemption grounds; instead, a successful

70
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73
74
75
76
78
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747 F.3d at 722.
747 F.3d at 722.
747 F.3d at 722-723.
555 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir.2009). See § III.C.b)
747 F.3d at 721.
992 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 1993).
992 F.2d at 294.
957 F. Supp.2d 552 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
957 F. Supp.2d 552 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
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preemption defense requires establishing conflict between federal and state standards,
or at least federal regulation of a particular aspect of safety.79
FAA regulation of aircraft design and manufacture is even more detailed than
regulation of aircrew qualification. Preemption in this field of aviation safety would
thus appear complete. Cleveland By and Through Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,80
however, is an influential case holding that the field of aircraft safety is not completely
preempted.81 The case involved a claim by the pilot of a Piper Super Cub PA–18–150
that his severe injuries in a crash were due to the negligent design of the aircraft. The
jury found that Piper had negligently designed the aircraft by providing for inadequate
visibility from the rear seat (from which the pilot was flying) and failing to provide a
rear shoulder harness.82 The court of appeals found that aircraft manufacturers could
comply with FAA "minimum" safety standards and also comply with standards of care
embodied in state tort law.83 Furthermore FAA approval of an aircraft's design "is not
intended to be the last word on safety. The FAA has given manufacturers broad
responsibilities for assuring their own compliance by appointing aircraft company
employees to “act as surrogates of the FAA in examining, inspecting, and testing
aircraft for purposes of certification.”84 There was, thus, no conflict preemption.
As noted in the discussion of O'Donnell, infra, subsequent Tenth Circuit caselaw
questions the viability of the Cleveland analysis.
When FAA regulations are silent, however, on the design of a particular subsystem,
there may be room for state law. The Martin court interpreted Montalvo to mean that
when the agency issues “pervasive regulations” in an area, like passenger warnings, the
FAA preempts all state law claims in that area. In areas without pervasive regulations
or other grounds for preemption, the state standard of care remains applicable."85 It
rejected the proposition that the aircraft certification process preempts every state
inquiry into aircraft design; it only preempts those design or performance matters that
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 558-559.
985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993).
985 F.2d at 1444.
985 F.2d at 1441.
985 F.2d at 1445.
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are explicitly that are explicitly addressed by specific certification regulations.86 Aircraft
stairs were not among them:
"Airstairs are not pervasively regulated; the only regulation on airstairs is that
they can't be designed in a way that might block the emergency exits. 14 C.F.R. §
25.810. The regulations have nothing to say about handrails, or even stairs at all,
except in emergency landings. No federal regulation prohibits airstairs that are
prone to ice over, or that tend to collapse under passengers' weight. The
regulations say nothing about maintaining the stairs free of slippery substances,
or fixing loose steps before passengers catch their heels and trip. It's hard to
imagine that any and all state tort claims involving airplane stairs are preempted
by federal law. Because the agency has not comprehensively regulated airstairs,
the FAA has not preempted state law claims that the stairs are defective." 87
Unlike airplane stairs, pilot qualifications and medical standards are subject to detailed
FAA regulation.88 Thus the different result in Ventress.
The Martin court found support for its approach in Cleveland, Lake County.89
It acknowledged that the Third Circuit takes a different approach:
"The Third Circuit, considering a failure to warn claim, took a different
approach. Rather than limiting its analysis to regulations on warnings, the court
decided that “federal law establishes the applicable standards of care in the field
of air safety, generally, thus preempting the entire field from state and territorial
regulation.” Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir.1999).
The savings and insurance clauses, the court reasoned, only preserve state
remedies, while excluding all state standards of care. Id. at 367-68."90

555 F.3d at 811-812.
555 F.3d at 812.
88 747 F.3d at 721-722.
89 555 F.3d at 811. It also cited Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 788-89, 794-95
(6th Cir.2005) (citing Abdullah to find FAA preemption of a failure to warn claim, but applying a state
law analysis to a claim that a navigational instrument was defectively manufactured).
90 555 F.3d at 809.
86
87
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Later, in Gilstrap v. United Airlines, Inc., 91the Ninth Circuit embraced both Martin and
Abdullah:
"We find persuasive, and here adopt, Abdullah 's division of the FAA's field preemptive
effect into two components: state standards of care, which may be field-preempted by
pervasive regulations, and state remedies, which may survive even if the standard of
care is so preempted."92 The court's use of the words may and even if, however, still
allows for Martin's conclusion that preemption results only when the FAA has explicitly
regulated the particular aspect of safety involved in the state lawsuit.
c)
Passenger warnings and liquor service
In Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines,93 the court of appeals affirmed the district court's
conclusion that federal law preempted state negligence claims for an airline's failure to
warn about the danger of developing deep vein thrombosis. It reasoned that a stateimposed duty to warn would conflict with federal safety standards for pre-flight
passenger briefings, backed up by the FAA's occupation of the entire field of aviation
safety.94 It reviewed the legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act and Supreme
Court and court of appeals cases finding Congressional intent to "make the Federal
Aviation Administration the sole arbiter of air safety."95 It quoted Justice Jackson:
“Planes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal
permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified personnel
and under an intricate system of federal commands.”96
Although it expressed reluctance to infer preemption from the mere comprehensiveness
of statutory authority unless a federal agency has exercised the authority to occupy a
subfield,97 it found sufficient exercise of FAA authority to "infer a preemptive intent to
displace all state law on the subject of air safety."98

709 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2013).
709 F.3d at 1006 (emphasis added).
93 508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007).
94 508 F.3d at 468.
95 508 F.3d at 472.
96 508 F.3d at 471-472 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (J. Jackson,
concurring)).
97 508 F.3d at 470-471.
98 508 F.3d at 472 (emphasis added).
91
92
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Significantly, for extension of its reasoning to drone regulation, it cited the "uniqueness
of the aviation industry."99 "Aviation transportation requires more national coordination
than any other public transportation and also poses the largest risks. Regulation on a
national basis is required because air transportation is a national operation," it said. 100
As § III.A explains, this is not true of microdrone operations.
"If the FAA did not impliedly preempt state requirements for passenger warnings, each
state would be free to require any announcement it wished on all planes arriving in, or
departing from, its soil, or to impose liability for the violation of any jury's
determination that a standard the jury deems reasonable has been violated. Such a
patchwork of state laws in this airspace ... would create a crazyquilt effect. Congress
could not reasonably have intended an airline on a Providence-to-Baltimore-to-Miami
run to be subject to certain requirements in, for example Maryland, but not in Rhode
Island or in Florida. See id. It is equally as doubtful that Congress would have intended
the sufficiency of the Airlines' warnings to hinge on where each passenger on each
flight was likely to file suit. As the district court noted, such a result would be an
anathema to the FAA."101
It distinguished Skysign on the grounds that the FAA had not exercised its authority to
regulate aerial advertising.
In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell,102 the court of appeals reversed the district court and
held that state liquor regulation was preempted as applied to airline flights. It cited
Martin, but took a broader approach, using language that suggests that all aspects of
aviation safety are preempted--appearing to agree with Abdullah that the statutory
savings clause only preserves state remedies for violation of federal standard.
Nevertheless, the subject of alcohol service on air carrier aircraft is the subject of specific
FARs, and " By requiring airlines to comply with NMLCA, New Mexico is seeking to
impose additional training requirements on flight attendants and crew members
serving alcoholic beverages on airplanes."103 It also noted the FAA's detailed balancing
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of various considerations arising from alcohol service on flights.104 So whether the Tenth
Circuit would follow Martin or Abdullah is unclear.
The Tenth Circuit backed away from Cleveland, noting that its reasoning has been called
into question by subsequent Supreme Court cases.105 It did not overrule it, however.
It remanded, however, a claim for unsafe seating configurations, which required closer
analysis of airline-fare preemption.106
d)
Flight rules: Aerial advertising
Regulation of what aircraft may do in flight would seem to be at the heart of detailed
FAA regulation. Parts 71, 91, 97, 119, 135, and 136 of the FARs contain hundreds of
pages of specific operating rules. The regulations do not, however, cover everything. In
Skysign International, Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu,107 the court of appeals, affirming
the district court, held that local regulation of signage could be applied to bannertowing aircraft, notwithstanding broad federal preemption of aviation safety. The
plaintiff's helicopters operated under certificates of waiver (“COWAs”) issued by the
FAA.108 Because advertising is an activity traditionally regulated by the states rather
than by the federal government, the court presumed, "that federal law does not displace
Honolulu's regulatory authority over advertising absent a clear statement of the federal
intent to do so, either by Congress or by the FAA as Congress's delegate."109 It found
that Honolulu's general signage ordinance was entitled to this presumption, but not a
companion ordinance that singled out aviation by prohibiting any advertising on an
aircraft.110 It found that Congress expressly has preempted state regulation of aircraft
noise and airline pricing, but not state regulation of aerial advertising.111 Although the
court did not make this point, by the nature of the advertisement, the aircraft would not
leave the state. If the aircraft traveled between states carried an advertisement, the
outcome might be different.
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It was unwilling to infer field preemption from the "mere volume and complexity" of
federal aviation regulation,112 in the absence of any explicit federal regulation on the
subject a state seeks to regulate. It rejected the plaintiff's argument that preemption
should be inferred from FAA silence on a subject.113
Significantly, it was equally unwilling to infer preemption from overlapping safety
concerns:
"Skysign notes that Honolulu justifies its ordinance based in part on the danger that
distracting aerial advertising poses to motorists below, and it attempts to argue that
Congress has confided to the FAA exclusive authority over such safety concerns.
However, the provision it cites directs the FAA Administrator to “prescribe air traffic
regulations in the flight of aircraft (including regulations on safe altitudes) for ...
protecting individuals and property on the ground.” 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2)(B) (1994).
We do not read this provision to preclude local regulation with an identical purpose
that does not actually reach into the forbidden, exclusively federal areas, such as flight
paths, hours, or altitudes."114
By negative implication, a local ordinance that did address flight paths, hours, or
altitudes would be preempted.
Finally, the FAA COWAs115 did not give rise to preemption, because they expressly
required that the operator "understand" local laws relating to aerial signs.116
e)
Airport siting
The boundary between state and federal authority gets murkier when states determine
where airports can be located and what operations can occur to and from them. In this
regulatory arena, aviation safety and traditional state control of real property and its
uses overlap. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc.,117 is the leading Supreme
Court case on preemption of airport regulation. It held that a municipal noise ordinance

276 F.3d at 1116.
276 F.3d at 1116-1117.
114 276 F.3d at 1117.
115 Banner towing airplanes or helicopter requires a certificate of waiver ("COWA") issued by the FAA. 14
C.F.R. § 91.311.
116 276 F.3d at 1117-1118.
117 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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was preempted. The municipal ordinance prohibited jet aircraft from taking off from
the Hollywood-Burbank Airport between 11 PM of one day and 7 AM the next. The
only scheduled flight affected by the ordinance was an intrastate one.118
In its 5-4 decision, the Court focused its attention almost entirely on federal regulation
of aircraft noise rather than on general aviation safety regulation.119 It emphasized,
however, the interplay between operational restrictions to reduce noise and other
aspects of aircraft operation. "The Federal Aviation Act requires a delicate balance
between safety and efficiency and the protection of persons on the ground. Any
regulations adopted by the Administrator to control noise pollution must be consistent
with the ‘highest degree of safety.’"120 It also noted that local restrictions on hours of
operation would have a ripple effect through the national aviation system, and would
limit the FAA's flexibility in controlling traffic flow. 121
In Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus,122 the court of appeals reversed the district court and
held that a local ordinance prohibiting operation of seaplanes on a city-owned lake was
not preempted. The challenged ordinance provided:
“4.10. Nuisances prohibited. Land may not be used for any of the following
purposes, all of which are declared to be public nuisances:
“E. The mooring, docking, launching, storage, or use of any ... aircraft powered
by internal combustion engines....
“J. The landing upon the lands, waters, or ice surface within the Village of Lake
Angelus of any aircraft, airplane, sailplane, seaplane, helicopter, ground effect
vehicle, or lighter than air craft."123
The city council declared that the ordinances were intended to “protect the public
health, safety, and general welfare” of the residents, by preventing “noise, danger,
apprehension of danger, pollution, apprehension of pollution, contamination and
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infestation from other bodies of water, destruction of property values, and interference
with other lawful uses of the lake enjoyed by the great majority of citizens, including
boating, sailing, fishing, swimming, and other recreational uses.” 124
The court of appeals distinguished regulation of aircraft in flight from regulation of
aircraft landing sites, "which involves local control of land (or, in the present case,
water) use."125 It distinguished City of Burbank which held that a local noise ordinance
was preempted because it interfered with airport operations. Aircraft noise, the
Gustafson court said, is the subject of several explicit pronouncements by the FAA, the
EPA and in the legislation history of the Federal Aviation Act and the Noise Control
that embraced federal preemption.
"In contrast, in the present case, an examination of the Federal Aviation Act and
regulations concerning seaplanes and aircraft landing sites indicates that the
designation of plane landing sites is not pervasively regulated by federal law, but
instead is a matter left primarily to local control. In contrast to the pervasive
scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise found in Burbank, we fail to
identify any language in the Act, the regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Act, or the legislative history of the Act, which by implication preempts
enforcement of the City's ordinances prohibiting the operation of seaplanes on
Lake Angelus."126
It also found, in 14 C.F.R. § 157.7(a), the federal airport siting regulation an express
savings clause for local zoning and other land use regulation.127
It cited a number of earlier cases, finding that local airport siting regulation was not
preempted.128
It distinguished Command Helicopters, Inc. v. City of Chicago,129 finding local regulation of
helicopter heavy lift operations preempted because it conflicted with FAA regulations
on heavy lift operations.130
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In Condor Corp. v. City of St. Paul,131 the court of appeals summarily rejected the
plaintiff's argument that denial of a permit for a heliport intruded upon exclusive
federal power: "We see no conflict between a city's regulatory power over land use, and
the federal regulation of airspace, and have found no case recognizing a conflict." 132
In Golden State Farms, Inc. v. Bay,133 the New Jersey supreme court held that an ordinance
prohibiting the creation of private heliports was not preempted.
It distinguished heliport siting from matters that require national uniformity:
"The case at hand does not present a situation where preemption may be
predicated upon a felt need for a monolithic system of regulation. While in some
important aspects uniform regulation may be required, that obvious need does
not reach down to the level of the location of small, relatively isolated, privately
owned helistops or heliports." 134 It cited cases supporting its conclusion that
"state and local authority over the “operation and navigation of aircraft” is
supplanted by this federal regulation, . . . significant local power over ground
operations of aircraft remains viable."135
In Harrison v. Schwartz,136 Maryland's highest court held that certain zoning restrictions
imposed on airport operations were preempted and others were not.
It held that the following conditions in the conditional use permit were preempted:
"2. Aircraft take-offs shall be separated by intervals of at least 15 minutes in order to
minimize the adverse effects of aircraft engine noise upon the residents of the
surrounding area and to reduce the intensification of the use of the property in what is
otherwise a primarily rural residential area.
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130
131
132
133
134
135
136

691 F.Supp. 1148 (N.D.Ill.1988)
76 F.3d at 787-788.
912 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1990).
912 F.2d at 221.
390 A.2d 1177 (N.J. 1978).
390 A.2d at 1180-1181 (internal citations omitted).
390 A.2d at 1181.
572 A.2d 528 (Md. 1990).
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“3. Aircraft take-offs shall not be made before 9:00 a.m. or later than 7:00 p.m. on any
day."137
"To say that local authority may use its zoning power to ban a certain use is not the
same as to say that it may permit a use subject to conditions that affect air navigation." 138
In Riggs v. Burson,139 the Tennessee supreme court reversed the intermediate court and
held that a state statute prohibiting heliports within nine miles of the boundary of
national park was not preempted. The plaintiffs argued that the statute was aimed at
flight of aircraft and aircraft noise; the defendants argued that it was aimed at the use of
land and not the flight of aircraft.140 In agreeing with the defendants, the court cited
Gustafson and distinguished Burbank. It also found Condor Corp. persuasive. The
legislature articulated legitimate state interests: regulation of "noise, disruption and
safety risks caused by locating heliports near main roads and heavily populated
areas."141 "[W]e agree with the persuasive federal and state authority that has upheld
laws which restrict the use of land for the operation of helicopters or other aircraft."142
In Vorhees v. Naper Aero Club, Inc.,143 the district court distinguished Gustafson and held
that a private suit to enjoin operations on one runway of an existing airport was
preempted. The litigation did not involve regulation of land use by a public body.
Indeed, the airport was approved under state law.
"In Gustafson, the issue surrounded a city ordinance which prohibited the landing or
taking-off of airplanes on a city lake—not an airport or runway. In the present case,
plaintiff is seeking to enjoin an airport from using its already zoned runway—a runway
which is protected by a state statute. See 620 ILL.COMP.STAT. 5/49.1 (prohibiting
plaintiff from erecting any structure which would interfere with airport operations).
Significantly, the plaintiff does not contend that the airport's operation violates any
ordinance or regulation.
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572 A.2d at 529 (quoting conditions).
572 A.2d at 533.
941 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1997).
941 S.W.2d at 48 (summarizing arguments).
941 S.W.2d at 50.
941 S.W.2d at 51.
96 F. Supp.2d 820 (C.D. Ill. 2000).
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“In sum, although plaintiff claims that he is seeking to regulate land use, what he is
actually seeking to regulate is the use of the airspace above his property. Thus,
plaintiff's claim is preempted by the FAA. "144
Conversely, In Aviation Cadet Museum, Inc. v. Hammer,145 the supreme court of Arkansas
approved an injunction, on private nuisance grounds, against continued use of a private
airport. It found that the testimony at the trial established the elements of a commonlaw nuisance. A footnote asserts that land-use regulation is a matter of state law,146 but
there is no real analysis of federal preemption; apparently it was not asserted as a
defense.
f)
Environmental regulation of airport activities
A number of preemption cases involved environmental regulation by states and
municipalities. Environmental regulation, especially when it is of a general nature
rather than targeting specific airports or aviation operations, is likely to fall within state
police power.
In Tweed-New Haven Airport Authority v. Town of East Haven,147 the district court enjoined
local environmental authorities from interfering with construction of federally
approved and funded runway improvements. It held that the local governmental
regulation was preempted by the Federal Aviation Act under the doctrine of field
preemption.148 It distinguished Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd. v. City of Irving,149 as
involving land outside airport boundaries.150 It cited Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena v. City of
Los Angeles, in which the City of Los Angeles enacted an ordinance requiring a local
airport to submit for approval any plans that involved development-specifically
runway and taxiway construction-on airport-owned land.151
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96 F. Supp.2d at 823-824.
283 S.W.3d 198 (Ark. 2008).
283 S.W.3d at 201 n.2,
582 F. Supp.2d 261 (D. Conn. 2008).
582 F. Supp.2d at 272.
854 S.W.2d 161, 167 (Tex.Ct.App.1993),
582 F. Supp.2d at 269.
979 F.2d 1338, 1339 (9th Cir. 1992),
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In United States v. City of Berkeley,152 a case relied on by the Authority, the court
addressed the City's attempt to regulate construction of an airport surveillance radar.
According to the FAA, the construction was necessary to ensure air safety. The Berkeley
court held that the City's attempted regulation was impliedly preempted by the Federal
Aviation Act because federal regulation of the area is so pervasive.
It noted the following factors:


Non-proprietary versus proprietary; when the local government is the proprietor
of the airport, it has broader authority153



The court found preemption despite evidence of local concerns about traffic
disruption and adverse affects on the quality of life of local residents because of
noise.154

In Goodspeed Airport LLC v. East Haddam Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission,155
the court of appeals affirmed judgment after a bench trial that local regulation of tree
removal was not preempted. The plaintiff was privately owned and state licensed. The
airport argued that the trees were "obstructions to air navigation" under 14 CFR Pt 77,
and therefore that local limitations on removing them were preempted.156
It distinguished Tweed:
"The local regulatory action at issue in Tweed constitutes a much more direct
intrusion of local authority on the preempted field of air safety than do the
regulatory actions challenged here. Unlike Tweed–New Haven Airport,
Goodspeed Airport is not licensed by the FAA; it is not federally funded, and no
federal agency has approved or mandated the removal of the trees from its
property. Indeed, in its response to a formal inquiry from the district court in this
case, the federal government disclaimed any authority to order the trees'
removal. Therefore, while in Tweed the construction project was approved,
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735 F.Supp. 937, 940 (E.D.Mo. 1990).

The proprietary airport doctrine logically extends to any territory that a state or
municipality like a park district owns and already regulates extensively.
153

154
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156

582 F. Supp.2d at 271 n.13
634 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2011).
634 F.3d at 208.
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indeed required, by the federal regulatory authority, in this case there is no
federal interest in the Airport's proposed actions."157
It noted that the challenged local regulations did not single out aviation; they were
limitations of general applicability.158
It also observed that the FAA exercises only limited direct oversight of small airports.159
Matters within the boundary of an airport are more likely to be preempted than those
outside the boundaries, because activities outside the boundaries are less directly linked
to aviation.160
g)
Private actions for trespass to land
Not only state and local regulation through statutes, ordinances, and administrativeagency rules challenge federal authority. So do private actions for trespass to land. The
common law of trespass to land recognizes the overflight close to the ground may be a
trespass:
"(2) Flight by aircraft in the air space above the land of another is a trespass if,
but only if,
(a) it enters into the immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and
(b) it interferes substantially with the other's use and enjoyment of his land.”161
Early in the history of aviation, caselaw recognized that extensive liability for trespass
would interfere with aviation:
"The air, like the sea, is by its nature incapable of private ownership, except in so
far as one may actually use it. This principle was announced long ago by
Justinian. It is in fact the basis upon which practically all of our so-called water
codes are based.
634 F.3d at 211.
634 F.3d at 211.
159 634 F.3d at 211.
160 582 F. Supp.2d at 271-272.
161 Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 159 (2015) (discussing Causby). The Restatement suggests that
"immediate reaches" of the land extend to 50 feet, not to 500 feet and that heights inbetween, such as 150
feet would present questions of fact. Id. cmt. l.
157
158
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“We own so much of the space above the ground as we can occupy or make use
of, in connection with the enjoyment of our land. This right is not fixed. It varies
with our varying needs and is coextensive with them. The owner of land owns as
much of the space above him as he uses, but only so long as he uses it. All that
lies beyond belongs to the world.
“When it is said that man owns, or may own, to the heavens, that merely means
that no one can acquire a right to the space above him that will limit him in
whatever use he can make of it as a part of his enjoyment of the land. To this
extent his title to the air is paramount. No other person can acquire any title or
exclusive right to any space above him.
“Any use of such air or space by others which is injurious to his land, or which
constitutes an actual interference with his possession or his beneficial use thereof,
would be a trespass for which he would have remedy. But any claim of the
landowner beyond this cannot find a precedent in law, nor support in reason."162
The Supreme Court agreed:
"The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the
public domain. We need not determine at this time what those precise limits are.
Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent
as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land. We need not speculate on that phase of the present case."163
These principles suggest that drone flight over private property at the heights approved
for microdrones under the section 333 exemptions and proposed in the NPRM could
give rise to liability for trespass to land. While the advent of drones has extended the
concept of air navigation and of the National Airspace System to levels lower than the
traditional 500 feet, and thus extended the federal interest in regulating it to lower
Hinman v. Pacific Air Lines Transport Corp., 84 Fed. 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936) (affirming dismissal of
trespass complaint seeking injunction; allegations of flight from 5- to 100 feet over portion of plaintiff's
land). See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (citing Hinman approvingly).
163 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946) (holding that low-level flights by military aircraft
constituted a compensable taking); see also Bryski v. City of Chicago, 499 N.E.2d 162, 164-167 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986) (reviewing caselaw after Causby and concluding that sole remedy for aircraft noise from
municipal airport is action for reverse condemnation).
162
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levels,164 the fact remains that operations that close to the ground intrude upon
traditional property rights. The resulting tension between private interests in exclusive
domain over property and the public interest in air commerce places greater emphasis
on delineating the height to which property extends--a question on which the
Restatement, Hinman, and Causby punt. A reasonable rule of thumb is that a drone
flying lower than treetop level or the level of utility lines commits a trespass, but not if
it stays above that level.
D.

Interaction of Commerce Clause and federal preemption doctrine

The Commerce Clause and federal preemption doctrine interact in determining the
legality of state regulation of drones. Under its commerce power, the Congress retains
the authority explicitly to preempt state and local regulation, as it has done with respect
to economic regulation of airlines.165 It has explicitly forborn to do so with respect to
state law remedies.166 As to the more general realm of aviation safety regulation, it has
not spoken explicitly about state power, but it has granted broad authority to the FAA
and specified some details as to how the FAA should exercise that authority,
supporting the many judicial findings of implied preemption.167

But see § XXX (evaluating argument that Commerce Clause and thus the permissible
reach of FAA preemption does not extend below 500 feet).
165 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b): "a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of
at least 2 States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having
the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier." Compare
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 391 (1992) (state deceptive
advertising guidelines preempted as applied to airline fares) with American Airlines v.
Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 233 (1995) (state breach of contract action for violating terms of
frequent flying program not preempted). "[T]erms and conditions airlines offer and
passengers accept are privately ordered obligations and thus do not amount to a State's
‘enactment or enforcement of any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision
having the force and effect of law within the meaning of § 1305(a)(1)." 513 U.S. at 228.
See also 49 U.S.C. § 40116(b) (prohibiting state taxation air commerce).
166 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c): "A remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies
provided by law." See also 49 U.S.C. § 40116(c) (allowing landing fees for commercial
aircraft landing or taking off within a state)..
167 See § XXX.
164
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Under the Commerce Clause, it could decide in the future to adopt explicit statutory
preemption of state regulation of drones, partially or completely. It could not do so,
however, beyond the limits of interstate commerce.
The federal preemption question then turns on a parallel inquiry, with the FAA the
focus instead of the Congress, itself. Although some of the aviation preemption cases
make sweeping pronouncements of field preemption, in fact, closer examination of the
cases shows, not field preemption, at least not in general, but preemption turning on
whether the FAA has exercised its statutory authority with respect to a particular aspect
of safety. The analogy under the Commerce Clause is whether the Congress has
exercised its authority on a particular subject.
As long as it acts within its statutory authority, the FAA could adopt a new rule that not
only regulates some aspect of drone operations that theretofore had been unregulated,
but it also could explicitly preempt state regulation, either as to the subject of the new
FAA rule, or expressing its conclusion that that an aspect of safety should go
unregulated. As long it is as it has done neither, states have a plausible argument that
they are free to regulate the subject matter. Martin and Montalvo, discussed in § III.C, are
examples of this kind of analysis.
Having this power to define the boundary between federal and state regulation, the
FAA – or the Congress itself – could define a system for cooperative and concurrent
state and federal regulation of drones.

IV.

Space for states?

As part III concludes, states are free to regulate drone operations when a statute
explicitly saves room for state regulation as in tort remedies, or when the FAA has not
exercised its authority on a particular subject.
The FAA's approach to drone regulation makes room for some arguments not generally
available with respect to traditional aviation safety regulation. While the FAA’s
statutory mandate is to integrate drones into the National Airspace System, its approach
to microdrone regulation actually segregates microdrones and keeps them out of the vast
expanse of the national airspace where most manned aircraft operations occur. It
relegates microdrones to flights below 500 feet, where airplanes and helicopters cannot
operate safely, and also keeps them out of airport traffic areas where manned aircraft
36

operate below 500 feet in order to take off and land. The content of its proposed rule
and its section 333 exemptions prescribe few operating rules beyond the height limit
and a line of sight requirement –– which is tantamount to a horizontal distance
restriction.
In effect, the FAA has said, “You can fly microdrones commercially but only outside the
national airspace system.” It does not admit this, of course; its position, obvious from
the content of FAR Part 91, is that airspace all the way to the ground is regulated by
FAA rules. Indeed it says as much: "The FAA is responsible for the safety of U.S.
airspace from the ground up."168 There is no explicit floor of the national airspace
system expressed either in statute or rule.
What a defender of state regulatory authority would argue, however, is that the
combination of low altitudes and short distances puts microdrone flight, at least as the
FAA would allow it for commercial purposes —outside the National Airspace System,
outside the realm of Air Commerce, outside Congressional power under the Commerce
Clause, and beyond FAA jurisdiction. The FAA has defined microdrone airspace that is
inherently local, and well within traditional state police power.
This argument may prove too much, however, because it would negate FAA authority,
and leave it only to the states and their subdivisions to regulate low-level and close-in
drone flights—not only drone flights, but any flight by any kind of vehicle.

A.

Subjects of state regulation

If the argument prevails that the FAA has essentially defined the floor of the national
airspace system as 500 feet, states and localities have plenary authority to regulate lowlevel drone flight. If that argument fails or if plaintiffs with standing are unwilling to
make the argument, the scope of federal and state regulation depends upon application
of the caselaw. That yields the following conclusions.
States may not regulate subjects explicitly addressed by the FAA in its NPRM and
section 333 exemptions—at least they may not do so as to the holders of section 333
exemptions and more generally, once the regulation becomes final. That means that
states may not impose different weight limits, height limits, preflight inspection
FAA, Busting Myths about the FAA and Unmanned Aircraft,
http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=76240 (Feb. 26, 2015).
168
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requirements, accident reporting requirements, or periodic reporting requirements on
operations. It means they may not impose different DROP qualification, training,
certification, or experience requirements. They may not impose vehicle design
requirements.
Before the FAA issued its notice of proposed rulemaking and began granting section
333 exemptions, the FAA had not preempted the field of drone regulation because it
had not spoken and, under Martin, silence is not enough to preempt.
Now, however, the FAA has spoken. The Martin argument would be available only if
the FAA unexpectedly does not act reasonably promptly to turn its NPRM and the
comments it received into final rules. Otherwise, the defender of a state or local
measure would be left only the relatively weak read of the 10th circuit Cleveland
decision
In any event, the holder of a section 333 exemption would have a strong argument that
the detailed involvement of the FAA in crafting the exemption preempts state and local
regulation of matters covered by the exemption.
On the other hand, they retain their authority to enforce generally applicable state and
local law against disorderly conduct,169 public endangerment, 170 refusal to obey the
lawful command of a police officer, 171 or refusal to disperse.172 The FAA has published
guidance for local law enforcement personnel confronted with what they believe to be
impermissible microdrone operations.173 The language of the section 333 exemptions
itself does not address state and local regulation. The blanket COAs accompanying the
section 333 exemptions however do. A note on the first page says:

169
170

See 720 ILL. COMP STAT. 5/26-1 (2013) (disorderly conduct).
See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-5-207 (1987) (criminal endangerment).

See 720 ILL. COMP STAT. 5/31-1 (2014) (interference with public officers).
See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57-58 (1999) (affirming conclusion that gang-dispersal
ordinance was unconstitutionally vague; explaining that laws criminalizing disobedience of police order
are similarly questionable because of the possibility of arbitrary police orders); CA Penal Code §§ 409, 416
(refusal to disperse).
173 See FAA, Law Enforcement Guidance for Suspected Unauthorized UAS Operations,
http://www.faa.gov/uas/regulations_policies/media/FAA_UAS-PO_LEA_Guidance.pdf.
171
172
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“Note-This certificate constitutes a waiver of those Federal rules or regulations
specifically referred to above. It does not constitute a waiver of any State law or local
ordinance.” 174
Further language on the last page says:
“"This Certificate of Waiver or Authorization does not, in itself, waive any Title 14 Code
of Federal Regulations, nor any state law or local ordinance. Should the proposed
operation conflict with any state law or local ordinance, or require permission of local
authorities or property owners, it is the responsibility of the operator to resolve the
matter. This COA does not authorize flight within Special Use airspace without
approval from the scheduling agency. The operator is hereby authorized to operate the
small Unmanned Aircraft System in the National Airspace System."175
To say that the exemption and COA do not “waive” state law or local ordinance does
not say that any particular state law or local ordinance is valid under the Commerce
Clause or federal preemption analysis. If the FAA approves specific drone operations
through the section 333 process, preemption analysis says that a state cannot block the
operations unless pursuant to a traditional police power not singling out aviation.
It is unlikely that states have the power to enforce FARs directly. States have no
inherent power to enforce federal law.176 As a general matter, judicial enforcement of
FARs is reserved to the Secretary of Transportation and the Attorney General.177

FAA FORM 7711-1 UAS COA Attachment accompanying section 333 exemption No. Exemption No.
11310 (Colin Hinkle), docket no. FAA-2014-0608 at page 1 (Apr. 9, 2015)
175 FAA FORM 7711-1 UAS COA Attachment accompanying section 333 exemption No. Exemption No.
11310 (Colin Hinkle), docket no. FAA-2014-0608 at page 6 (Apr. 9, 2015)
176 Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y. UNIV. L. REV. 698, 708 (2011) (asserting that
states have no inherent power to enforce federal law); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263-64
(1972) (affirming dismissal of state parens patriae suit for damages under Clayton antitrust act);
Connecticut v. Health Net, Inc., 383 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of action by state
to enforce ERISA; no evidence of Congressional intent to give states enforcement standing).
177 See Bonano v. East Caribbean Airline Corp., 365 F.3d 81, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that Congress
meant to reserve enforcement of aviation regulations to the FAA); Schmelling v. NORDAM, 97 F.3d 1336
(10th Cir. 1996) (interpreting 49 U.S.C. section 46108 and holding that Federal Aviation Act does not grant
private right of action to enforce FAA rules; affirming dismissal of action by former maintenance
employer challenging dismissal for failing drug test).
174
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State courts remain open to adjudicate claims of invasion of privacy, trespass to land, or
negligence so long as the elements of each tort applied in a particular drone case do not
conflict with FAA rules.
For example, a jury instruction in a privacy case that tells the jury it may find the
defendant liable only if it finds intent to intrude into private activities in a manner that a
reasonable person would find offensive178 would protect the privacy litigation from
preemption. Intent to intrude is an element that the FAA does not address; just like it
did not address the design of airstairs in Martin.179 Conversely, a jury instruction in a
negligence case that defines the standard of care as flying no lower than 1000 feet above
private property, or testimony allowing a jury to find the same thing, would result in
preemption.
As aviation matured through the twentieth century, landowners periodically sued
aircraft operators for trespass and nuisance.180 Most of the trespass cases confronted
questions about how high above the ground the property owner’s rights extend.181
Above that height, trespass liability is preempted by FAA regulation. As for the
manned aircraft, machodrone flight is unlikely to engender difficulty with height
questions. This question of the vertical extent of property is less prominent for
microdrone operations. A landowner’s exclusive rights surely extend to 500 or 1,000 feet
above the ground, as a handful of older aviation cases hold.

The tort of invasion of privacy-intrusion upon seclusion is defined as "One who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person." Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 652B (1977).
178

179

See notes XXX-XXX and accompanying text, supra.

See, e.g., Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Transp. Corp., 94 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936) (rejecting trespass liability
for aircraft overflying private property).
181 Compare United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (holding that military flights at eighty-three
feet over plaintiff's property constituted a compensable "taking" because it encroached on plaintiff's
property rights), with Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) (holding that high-altitude flight creating sonic
booms did not constitute a trespass); See also Pueblo of Sandia ex rel. Chaves v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043, 1045
(10th Cir. 1974) (rejecting trespass action against aircraft operator because no proof of actual injury to
concrete uses of land). "The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he can
occupy or use in connection with the land." Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
180
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When states and municipalities adopt legislation or rules that target drones, it is more
likely to be preempted than a state statute or regulation of general effect, as relating to
noise, taxation, or environmental protection.
When state legislation and regulation specifies limits on flight profiles, crew
qualifications, or aircraft design, it is more likely to be preempted than initiatives that
address matters not directly related to flight, such as business financial reserves,
employee vacation or sick leave, minimum wages, or employment discrimination.
French, Montalvo and O’Donnell are examples of state regulation that intrudes too far
into matters regulated by the FAA—definition of flight crew duties. Skysign is an
example of general state regulation of advertising, found not to be preempted, and
Goodspeed Airport is an example of non-preempted environmental regulation.
If an existing or proposed FAA rule exists on a particular subject addressed by state
legislation and regulation, it is more likely to be preempted. Montalvo and O’Donnell are
examples. But if the if the FAA has left a gap in its regulations on the particular subject,
state action to fill the gap is less likely to be preempted, even if the FAA regulates the
general area. Regulation of airstairs in Martin is an example.
Moreover, if a state narrowly targets a particular highly localized area of drone
operations, and relates it to matters of traditional state concern, such as personal
privacy, security of property occupancy, preemption is less likely. Deference usually
given to matters of traditional state concern, and the argument is stronger that the
activity is outside the Commerce Clause.
If a state incorporates federal regulatory standards into its tort law182 and provides its
own remedies when a plaintiff can prove violation of the standards, proximate
causation, and injury, preemption is unlikely. Cleveland is an example, although it goes
further in allowing state regulation. Abdullah is square-on support for the proposition,
and the other products liability cases discussed in § III.C embrace the distinction.
The caselaw validating state regulation of airport siting supports the proposition that
states and municipalities have the power to specify where drones may take off and
land, effectively limiting where microdrones may fly, given their short range.

182

The common-law doctrine of negligence per se is an example of such incorporation.
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Recognizing traditional state power to preserve public order, states should have the
power to establish tort liability or to criminalize reckless conduct, 183

183

See generally See generally http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2014/07/2-drone-pilots-

arrested-for-allegedly-endangering-nypd-helicopter.html;
http://collegespun.com/sec/alabama-sec/someone-got-struck-by-a-drone-outsidebryant-denny-stadium-saturday-afternoon;
http://7online.com/archive/9292217/http://rt.com/usa/185480-new-york-tennis-drone/
(news reports of drone flights resulting in charges of reckless endangerment).
In Alabama, “A person commits the crime of reckless endangerment if he recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another
person.” AL Code § 13A-6-24.
New York has both a first degree and second degree reckless endangerment statute.
Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree occurs, “when the person recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another
person.” NY Code 120.20. Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree occurs, “when,
under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person.” NY Code
120.25. In Illinois, 720 ILCS 5/12-5 provides:
Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct.
(a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or
unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that:
(1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or
(2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another
person.
(b) Sentence.
Reckless conduct under subdivision (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. Reckless
conduct under subdivision (a)(2) is a Class 4 felony.”
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although this also is the subject of an FAA rule prohibiting reckless flight operations.184
State or municipal regulations increasing the height at which drones can be flown
would be preempted, because of the FAA prescription of a maximum height above
ground level, justified by reducing interference between drones and higher flying
manned aircraft. On the other hand, a state or local rule establishing a minimum height
is less likely to be preempted because there is no FAA-established minimum height, and
because of traditional police power to regulate land use. The cases involving claims of
trespass to land by aircraft might suggest otherwise, however.185
Limiting the purposes for which drones may be flown, for example, prohibiting flights
for surveillance or to capture imagery of a particular individual might be permissible,
because the FARs, while imposing different airman and aircraft certification and
different flight rules for different purposes such as banner towing, med-evac, and
tourism in certain areas do this because of differing types of safety threats. A state or
local law limiting purposes would be aimed instead at exercising traditional police
power over privacy or land use. To the contrary is a recent student note186 concludes
that state and municipal laws focused on drone safety, such as measures limiting flight
altitudes or flights over populated areas, are likely to be preempted.187 Conversely, the
author concludes that state and local regulation of surveillance, justified by protection
of personal privacy, may survive preemption challenges, at least if they apply the same
limitations to manned aircraft as to drones.188
States should be able to regulate data collection, to limit liability for accidents, and to
require liability insurance, because there is no federal aviation law on these subjects,
and because of traditional—and statutory189—state prerogatives over insurance.
The airport regulation preemption decisions suggest that states and municipalities have
more non-preempted power over facilities they own and manage than over facilities in

14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (prohibiting careless or reckless operation).
See § XXX.
186 Ray Carver, State Drone Laws: A Legitimate Answer to State Concerns or a Violation of Federal
Sovereignty, 31 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 377 (2015).
187 31 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. at 404.
188 31 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. at 404-405.
184
185

189

15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (saving state insurance regulation from federal preemption).
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private hands. In the drone context, that means that states and municipalities likely
have more authority to regulate conduct in public spaces than they do over private
property, especially over public parks. They already regulate access to public parks,
charge fees, and determine what activities are permissible. It is a relatively simple
matter, as the Chicago Park District Commission proposes to do, simply to add
microdrone flight to the list of activities that are prohibited unless one obtains a permit.
The distinction between sovereign and government between proprietary and
governmental functions was enshrined in Supreme Court case law for a while with
respect to the reach your federal labor law into local government employment.190 The
distinction is largely been abandoned as a touchstone of labor law preemption, but
conceptually, it remains viable as a federalism principal.
B.

Model aircraft and “consumer drones”

Section 336 of the 2012 Act191 prohibits the FAA from promulgating any rule or
regulation applicable to model aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds, as long as they
are flown consistent with "community-based" guidelines, as a part of “community
based programming,” and not near airports. The reference to community-based
guidelines is generally understood to guidelines issued by the Academy of Model
Aeronautics.192 The reference to “programming” probably means as a part of a local
model aircraft club sponsored outing, but the reference is ambiguous.
Section 336 says nothing about state or local regulations, and its withholding of
authority for the FAA leaves a relatively clear field for states to regulate model aircraft
operations.
The safe harbor for model aircraft is written around traditional practices of wellorganized and long-established model aircraft hobbyist organizations such as the XXX.
In a traditional model aircraft club, RC hobbyists get together at designated fields as a
group and cooperatively fly their aircraft, usually with one person serving as the pilot,
and the second serving as an observer. Adherence to safe practices depends on the
culture of a particular group and the dynamics of interaction on a particular day, but

190
191
192

CITE and Discuss Usery v Maryland.
2012 Act § 336.
http://www.modelaircraft.org/
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the clubs have rules, both general and specific for operations for any particular field,
and the club members generally follow them, exerting social pressure on anyone who
deviates. A visit to an RC hobbyist field, encounters hobbyists with their RC airplanes
flying them in pairs, talking and joking about their plans and past exploits. They all
know each other. It unlikely that one of them would stray too far from the norm and
risk getting kicked out of the club.
If a club member gets interested in drones and buys a DJI Phantom or 3Drobotics Solo,
he is likely to fly it in this fashion—unless he decides to try to make money with it.
Then the pathway of the section 333 exemption process and the eventual final rule for
sUAS are open to him. His habit of compliance with RC club rules and his general
awareness of the FAA probably will cause him to comply rather than just to ignore the
restrictions on commercial microdrone flight.
None of this poses any significant new threat to other aircraft or to the citizenry in
general. Hobbyists have a good safety record, and commercial microdrone operators
are unlikely to put their exemptions and certificates at risk by flouting the FAA's detail
rules for commercial operations – whatever their eventual content.
The threat comes from a new quarter: from the thousands of people who got a
microdrones as Christmas or birthday presents, but have no prior connection with an
RC model club or any prior interest in tinkering with model aircraft. Some of them have
entrepreneurial instincts; many already are entrepreneurs, especially photographers,
freelance journalist, civil engineers, surveyors that mostly account for the nearly 700
section 323 exemptions that have been granted, and the much larger number of pending
petitions. But the vast majority of these casual purchasers do not plan on starting a
business or making arrangements to fly there drone as a part of an RC club activity.
They are going to take it out into their backyards, local parks, and nearby
schoolgrounds and fly for fun. When they go to a sporting event, a music festival, or
some other recreational gathering, they will think about taking their drone for the same
reason they take their cameras. They'll take their drones on their vacations for the same
reasons they take their cameras on vacation: it will be a good way to get some good
imagery for their Facebook pages and to record videos to put on YouTube.
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This is the source of the greatest threat, not RC hobbyists or commercial microdrone
operators. The drone that landed on the White House lawn193 was not being flown for
commercial purposes; it was flown for fun in connection with an alcohol-fueled party.
Likewise the incident in King County Washington194 involved recreational, rather than
commercial, drone flight. Arguably, these consumer operations fall outside the
statutory safe harbor for RC hobbyists because they are not:
"operated in accordance with a community based set of safety guidelines and within the
programming of a nationwide community-based organization."195
The Conference Report on the 2012 Act explains:
"In this section the term ‘’nationwide community-based organization’ is intended
to mean a membership based association that represents the aeromodeling
community within the United States; provides its members a comprehensive set
of safety guidelines that underscores safe aeromodeling operations within the
National Airspace System and the protection and safety of the general public on
the ground; develops and maintains mutually supportive programming with
educational institutions, government entities and other aviation associations; and
acts as a liaison with government agencies as an advocate for its members."196
There is enough ambiguity in the language, however, to support broad claims that the
Congress has placed all forms of consumer drone activity beyond the FAA's reach. The
statute may be amended, of course, as S.1608 proposes to do. But any proposed

Michael D. Shear and Michael S. Schmidt, White House Drone Crash Described as a
U.S. Worker’s Drunken Lark, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/us/white-house-drone.html?_r=0.
194 FAA investigating drone flying near news helicopters (March 17, 2015),
http://www.kirotv.com/news/news/faa-investigating-drone-flying-near-newshelicopte/nkYk7/ (reporting on near miss between drone and news helicopters).
195 2012 Act § 336(a)(2).
196 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Conference Report to Accompany H.R.
658, Rep. No. 112-381, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt381/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt381.pdf.XXX and
XXX
193
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amendment is like to the face ferocious opposition from the RC hobbyist community
and therefore is uncertain of passage.
Even if S.1608 becomes law, or if the FAA decides to impose automation performance
requirements on microdrones as a prerequisite for sale,197 anarchy will be the norm for
consumer drones unless states and municipalities supplement FAA enforcement
resources. If states and municipalities decide to step in, the preemption barriers are
modest. States have a long history of regulating recreational activity that may pose
safety problems: hunting, archery, recreational boating, all-terrain vehicles. 198 Requiring
consumer drones to fly down low, stay within line of sight of the operator, not to fly
over people, and to fly in public parks only if they have a permit is not likely to
interfere with commercial microdrone operations or to interfere with the operation of
the National Airspace System.199
State and local regulation of consumer drones will have little adverse effect on the
economics of commercial drone operation, because they are not being flown
commercially--if the consumer drone regulations exclude commercial microdrone
operations conducted under FAA rules and approvals.200
Limiting state and local regulation to risk-based and performance-oriented rules is a
good idea anyway, but even if they are not so limited, the adverse effect on commercial
designs may be limited because of a growing differentiation between Consumer designs
and even low-end commercial designs.201
The matters outlined in section IV.A that are off-limits to state and local regulations of
commercial drone activity are permissible subjects for state and local regulation of
recreational drone activity. If states exercise that authority, they can be significant
contributors to public safety and other legitimate state interests.

Its current authority to do so is uncertain. Compare statutory language for motor
vehicle regulation and electronic device regulation with FAA's authority.
198 This puts states in a strong position under the first criterion set forth in § XXX.
199
This puts states in a strong position under the second criterion set forth in § XXX.
200 This puts states in a strong position under the third criterion set forth in § XXX.
201 This puts states in a strong position under the fourth criterion set forth in § XXX.
197
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C.

State and local initiatives

Only a handful of states have enacted statutes limiting the operation of drones
(Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or “UAVs”). Most of these laws prevent law
enforcement use of drones for evidence gathering without appropriate search
warrants. Some of these limitations prohibit law enforcement and citizens from
weaponizing drones. Some heighten privacy protection by prohibiting aerial
surveillance without consent. A few statutes limit drone involvement in hunting.
The following table lists the statutes. It is followed by a discussion of specific
statutory provisions and an evaluation of the likelihood of federal preemption.

State Legislation
Enacted

Bill

Date Approved

Florida

C.S.C.S.S.S.B 766 May 14, 2015
Freedom from
Unwarranted
Surveillance Act

Date Effective

Paraphrase
Prohibits law
enforcement use to
gather evidence.
Prohibits recording
an image of a
privately owned
property or of the
owner (tenant,
occupant, invitee
etc.) violating a
reasonable
expectation of
privacy.
Exceptions: police
get warrant,
“perform
reasonable tasks”
within the scope of
one’s license,
property
appraisals, utility
inspection,
mapping,
delivering cargo
(as long as with
FAA compliance),
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State Legislation
Enacted

Bill

Date Approved

Date Effective

Paraphrase

Idaho

IC 21-213

No law
enforcement
searches without a
warrant.
No aerial
photography
without prior
consent.

Illinois

720 Ill. Comp. Stat
5/48-3
Freedom from
Drone Surveillance
Act

Prohibits law
enforcement use of
drones without a
warrant.
No drone
interference with
hunters

Indiana

IC 35-33-5-9

July 1, 2014

No law
enforcement use
without a warrant

Iowa

HF 2289

May 23, 2014

No drones for
traffic law
enforcement.
Evidence obtained
with a drone
without search
warrant is
inadmissible.
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State Legislation
Enacted

Bill

Date Approved

Date Effective

Paraphrase

Maryland

SB 370

May 12, 2015

July 1, 2015

Only the state can
make drone laws
(preempts counties
and local
ordinances).

Mississippi

SB 2022

April 23, 2015

Montana

HB 330

April 23, 2015

Define felonious
trespass to include
peeping through a
window, hole, or
opening with a
drone. Prohibits
photographs and
video of people
without consent

October 1, 2015

No weaponized or
armored drones for
law enforcement
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State Legislation
Enacted

Bill

Nevada

AB 236

Date Approved

Date Effective

No person shall
weaponize a drone
or operate a
weaponized drone.
No operation within
500 ft or 250ft
vertically from a
“critical facility” and
5 miles from airport
without consent.
Right of action
(trespass) if drone
less than 250ft
over property and
property owner
notifies DROP that
the flight is
unauthorized.
No use for law
enforcement to
collect evidence.
Creates a public
registry of all state
operated drones.

The largest and
most
comprehensive bill.

New Hampshire

SB 222 Fish and
Game—Animal—
Harassment

Paraphrase

May 7, 2015

January 1, 2016

No activity that
disturbs animals
with intent to
prevent their lawful
taking. No drone
use with intent to
conduct video
surveillance of
citizen lawfully
hunting, finishing,
or trapping, without
prior consent.
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State Legislation
Enacted

Bill

Date Approved

Date Effective

North Dakota

HB 1328

April 15, 2015

Evidence obtained
by a drone not
admissible as
evidence without a
search warrant nor
can law
enforcement use
drone footage as a
basis for probable
cause. No lethal
weapons on a
drone. Does not
prohibit drone
usage for research
and development
by edu. inst.

Oregon

HB 2534 Fish and
Game—Fish and
Wildlife
Commission—
Drone Regulation

May 12, 2015

Prohibit the use of
drones related to
pursuit of wildlife
(angling, hunting,
trapping) or aiding
through use of
drones to harass,
track, locate, or
scout wildlife; and
interfere with
angling, hunting,
and trapping.
The definition of
drone includes
unmanned waterbased vehicles

HB 2354: only
definition of drone
changed to
“unmanned aircraft
system”

Tennessee

HB 153 Crimes
and Offenses—
Drones—
Photography and
Pictures

April 20, 2015

July 1, 2015

Paraphrase

No operation over
events with 100+
attendees for a
ticked event; no
flight around
fireworks without
event organizer’s
consent;
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State Legislation
Enacted

Bill

Texas

Date Approved

Date Effective

Paraphrase
Law enforcement
must submit a
report of drone use
to the governor.

423.008

Utah

HB 296

March 27, 2015

West Virginia

HB 2515 Wildlife— April 2, 2015
Animals—
Weapons

Prohibits hunting,
with drone..

Wisconsin

WSA 941.292
WSA 175.55

No weaponized
drones.

April 10, 2014

Evidence obtained
by a drone not
admissible as
evidence without a
search warrant.

No law
enforcement use
without a warrant.

Law Enforcement . The drone statutes reinforce the Constitutional limitation on
unreasonable searches and seizures. This prevents law enforcement from taking
advantage of a new technology to conduct warrantless searches.
Some states prohibit law enforcement from gathering evidence without a
search warrant. In Illinois, law enforcement “may not use a drone to gather
information”202 unless it obtains a search warrant prior to the search.203 Law
enforcement agents may use drones in certain circumstances like crime scene and
traffic investigation.204 Wisconsin and Indiana, like Illinois, prohibit the use of

202

725 ILCS 167/10
725 ILCS 167/15 (2)
204
725 ILCS 167/15 (5) The Illinois statute confines law enforcement drone operation to the
geographic location and imposes a time limit on investigation.
203
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drones to gather evidence without a search warrant.205 Violation results in
inadmissibility of the evidence. In addition, North Dakota prohibits use of drone
imagery to establish probable cause to obtain a search warrant that would lead to
drone captured evidence.206.
Some states prohibit law enforcement from weaponizing a drone.207 In
addition to weaponizing a drone, Wisconsin prohibits law enforcement from
equipping a drone with armor.208 Other states extend this prohibition to civilian
drone operations.209
Texas addresses concerns about law enforcement abuse but not limiting
drone use. The Texas statute does not explicitly require a search warrant when law
enforcement conducts an aerial search to gather evidence using a drone.210 It merely
requires that the law enforcement agency must, every two years, submit a written
report to the governor, the governor lieutenant, and each member of the state
legislature with a list of drone missions, costs of operating and maintaining a drone,
and a list of non-criminal drone investigations.211
Privacy. States with drone privacy statutes address the fear of citizens using drones
as “prying eyes” to collect information about their neighbors from an aerial vantage
point. They prohibit on aerial imagery capture without consent.212 Florida, for
example, prohibits any surveillance of a privately owned property, its owner and
anyone legally occupying the premise (landlord, tenant, or licensee).213 The Idaho
statute prohibits capturing imagery of land and occupants without prior consent of
the owner or the occupant.214 Additionally, some states legitimate drone use over
property for property appraisals, utility inspections, and mapping if the DROP
performs the “reasonable task” under a state occupational license.215
Flying a drone over private property without consent can lead to a trespass claim
against the DROP or a penalty. Some states allow a trespass claim after the land
owner notifies the DROP about an unauthorized flight over the land owner’s land
lower than 250 feet.216 Texas, for example, creates a civil right of action against a
violating DROP and allows a land owner to recover a penalty for every captured

205

WSA 175.55; IC 35-33-5-9. See Florida, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Iowa, N Dakota (prohibiting
drone use to gather evidence without a search warrant).
206
N Dakota HB 1328
207
Montana HB 330
208
WSA 175.55
209
Nevada AB 236, N Dakota,
Texas Drone Statute 423.008
Id.
212 See
213 Florida Freedom From Unwarranted Surveillance Act
214 Idaho 21-213
215 Florida Freedom From Unwarranted Surveillance Act
216 Nevada AB 236
210
211
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image, or for distributing images.217 In Mississippi, a drone trespass is a “felonious
trespass” when a DROP uses a drone to peep through a “window, hole, or
opening.”218 For drone operation during live events, Tennessee prohibits
unauthorized use with more than 100 guests attending a ticketed event.219
Hunting. Aside from privacy concerns, some states worry about the role of drones in
the outdoors by enacting bills concerning hunting, fishing, and trapping. New
Hampshire prohibits drone use with the intent to prevent lawful taking by
hunters.220 Oregon, for example, prohibits drone use to interfere with hunting,
trapping, and finishing.221 State statues also prohibit drone use to aid in hunting. It
is illegal to track, locate, and scout for wild animals222 and to herd animals with a
drone to hunt.223 Drone wildlife statutes prevent DROPs from interfering with
other’s enjoyment of wildlife sports and from taking advantage of drone to gain an
upper-hand in outdoor sport.
The measures restricting what state or local law-enforcement may do with drones are
not preempted, because of the traditionally strong state interest in regulating its own
law-enforcement bodies and the limited effect on air commerce Likewise, the measures
related to hunting are not preempted, because of the traditional state interest in that
subject.
The Tennessee, Florida, Idaho, and Mississippi statutes present more interesting
preemption questions because they restrict the operations of civilian drones outside the
hunting context. Tennessee's prohibition of flying over major events can be justified by
the state’s interest in public safety. Limitations on what people can do in connection
with large public events are a traditional mainstay of state and local regulation. The
Tennessee crowd overflight prohibition is congruent with the section 333 exemption
and (probable) eventual final-rule prohibition on flying over crowds. Tennessee could
further justify its involvement as simply providing additional enforcement mechanisms
for a federally established standard – similar to what happens when state, law provides
toward remedies for conduct that violates federal standard. On the other hand, a state
crowd overflight restriction that goes well beyond the federal standard is more
vulnerable to a preemption challenge.
Texas 423.006
Mississippi SB 2022
219 HB 153
220 New Hampshire SB 222
221 Oregon HB 2534
222 Id.
223 West Virginia HB 2515
217
218
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The prohibition against aerial imagery over property without the owner's consent and
of subjects without their consent can be justified as an extension of traditional state
measures to protect private property and personal privacy interests, matters generally
left to the states and covered by extensive state regulation already. Many states already
prohibit capturing – or at least publishing –images of persons without their consent.224
State overflight rules on this subject, however, are more vulnerable to preemption
challenges when they extend the height below which permission is required. 250 feet
places half of the FAA’s allowable height under off-limits, especially if it is
accompanied by restrictions or overflight of public spaces. Such inconsistent height
limits interfere with the federal regulatory regime and burden air commerce.
The state privacy measures would fare better under preemption analysis if they simply
extend existing state limitations on photographing individuals; such measures do not
single out drones or other aircraft for special restrictions. The caselaw is more
hospitable to state regulation of general application.

D.

Space for municipalities?

The sovereignties in the United States constitutional structure are the federal
government and the states; not municipalities.225 It was the states that met at the
Constitutional convention and ceded some of their sovereign power to the United
States; counties, towns, and cities were not at the table.226
States started out with sovereignty and gave some of it up—part of it upward, to the
national sovereign, and part of it downward to counties, cities, and towns. Counties and
other municipalities enjoy only such powers as are granted by the sovereign state. The
American Civil War established that states, having ratified the United States
Constitution, are not entitled to take back any of the sovereignty they ceded to the
federal government, but the sovereignty they ceded downward, to local units of

CITE examples—CA, IL.
225 Indian tribes also are sovereign, but there role in drone regulation is beyond the
scope of this article.
226 CITE for constitutional convention
224
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government, they can take back at any time. A 2015 Maryland statute preempts
municipal drone regulation.227

Of course, to the extent that state local government prerogatives are codified in state
constitutions, the process for taking it back may be more arduous than simply passing a
bill in one session of the Legislature. In some states, local government enjoys only those
governmental authorities explicitly granted to them by state statute or constitutional
provision. That was the case in Alabama for many years.228 The trend, however, is for
states to adopt home rule legislation that grants general governmental power – roughly
equivalent to that exercised by the state – to municipalities unless a specific power is
withheld in the home rule statute or by subsequent legislation.229

E.

Mechanisms for Federal-state cooperation

Cooperative federal-state regulation is not uncommon. Mechanisms for sharing federal
and state authority over the same subject matter are pillars of air pollution regulation,
occupational safety and health regulation, and remedying employment discrimination.

227

(B) “Only the State may enact a law or take any other action to prohibit, restrict, or

regulate the testing or operation of unmanned aircraft systems in the State.
(1)

(C) Subsection (B) of this Section:
(2) Preempts the authority of a county or municipality to prohibit, restrict, or
regulate the testing or operation of unmanned aircraft systems; and
supersedes any existing law or ordinance of a county or municipality that prohibits, restricts, or regulates
the testing or operation of unmanned aircraft systems.” SB 0370 (B)-(C).

Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L.Rev. 1113, 1127 n.64 (2007)
(characterizing Alabama's lack of meaningful home rule).
229 See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2255, 2277-2322 (2003)
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(analyzing history and competing philosophies of home rule); City of Commerce City v.
State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1279 (Colo. 2002) (describing home rule authority).
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The Clean Air Act distributes responsibility for setting and enforcing air-pollution
standards among the federal EPA and state and local governments.230
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires the complaints of employment
discrimination be filed first with state anti-discrimination agencies, if they exist, before
the federal EEOC has jurisdiction.231
The Congress, in crafting the federal Occupational and Safety Act, was reluctant to
federalize workplace safety. Accordingly, it provided for a system of state
implementation plans under federal OSHA oversight.232

V.

Economic and political realities

Regulation arises, not only from politics and law, but also from economics and ideas.
A.

Economics

Two distinct markets exist for commercial microdrone activities. The first is the market
for the vehicles themselves; the second is the market for services provided by operators
of those vehicles. The market for the vehicles is undeniably national and international in
character. The dominant vendor for small drones in the United States is DJI, a Chinese
company. U.S. vendors such as 3Drobotics, like their foreign counterparts, seek
footholds in international markets. Allowing states to set different standards for
vehicles would significantly interfere with the efficient functioning of these markets,
and it would be even worse if regulations are made at the local level. It would be bad
enough to need 50 different business plans and vehicle requirements; let alone 36,000
for municipalities.233 Of course, drone manufacturers and operators could use a

Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation Plans -- Thirty-Seven Years
of Increasing Complexity, 15 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 209, 211-212 (2004) (explaining allocation of federal, state,
and local authority in state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act).
231 See Procedure Under Title VII, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1195, 1213-1216 (1971) (criticizing deferral-state
procedure).
232 See AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 570 F.2d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (remanding OSHA regulations on
staffing and funding of state implementation plans); Courtney M. Malveaux, OSHA Enforcement of the
“as effective as” Standard for State Plans: Serving Process or People?, 46 U. Rich. L. Rev. 323, 324-325
(2011) (explaining that Occupational Safety and Health Act allows states to adopt their own
implementation plans so long as they are at least as effective as federal standards).
233 https://www.census.gov/govs/go/municipal_township_govs.html (noting number of sub-county
municipalities in the United States).
230
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“common denominator” model and adapt to the most stringent regulatory
requirements in all their models. This would obviously increase costs.
The market for drone services, in contrast, is inherently local. The limited range of the
available vehicles means that any particular mission is going to take place in a relatively
small area. For example, an Amazon delivery drone can only deliver packages within
the range of the battery flight time limitations. Thus, Amazon can only serve the
market immediately adjacent to its warehouse and distribution offices.
Even so, there are broader impacts. Depending on the altitudes at which they are flown,
these local missions could pose collision risks to interstate and international airline and
commercial operations.
Also, economies of scale for marketing, finance, and operations management may lead
commercial drone operators over time to expand, so they offer the same or similar
services in more than one geographic area. One crew dispatcher for DROPs can handle
more than one customer’s callouts. Promotional materials prepared for one local market
can be made suitable for others. Investment promotion, cash management, accounting,
purchasing, and liability insurance all represent fixed costs that can be shared among
different local markets
The enterprise structure of the commercial helicopter industry is an analogy to how
commercial drone operations will be structured; the markets and missions are, in many
respects, similar. National or regional operations instead of purely local ones
predominate for oil and gas exploration crew transportation, for medevac, for electronic
newsgathering, and for much utility infrastructure inspection. To be sure, there are
many purely local operators in each of these industry sectors, but they provide services
mostly at the margins of their customers’ operations and of their own, flying an
occasional utility patrol or event shot opportunistically in to fill out a portfolio of that
offers flights for almost any purpose, frequently coupled with flight training as the
mainstay business.
Drone operator organizational structure also will depend, to some extent, on the
organization structure of the customers for drone services. An enterprise with a national
or international footprint is likely to want to standardize drone services contracts across
its geographically dispersed operations. It can do this, of course, while still allowing
local decision-makers to contract with local operators, but the economies of scale from
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both buyers and sellers of drone services will push things toward arrangements of
wider scope.
Different operating rules in different parts of the country would be impediments to
realizing these efficiencies. Even if compliance is not a problem – for example not flying
over 200 feet in New York State, but up to 500 feet in Colorado; or being allowed to fly
the drone from a moving vehicle in Nebraska but not in Michigan—finding out what
the rules are if they vary from place to place would impose significant additional
transaction costs for legal research and advice.

B.

Politics

Politics will share the stage with law and economics in determining how regulatory
power over drones will be allocated among the federal government, states, and
municipalities. Microdrones will produce a clash over federalism when constituent or
interest group pressures to draft drone legislation prove irresistible. Two different
political issues exist. The first is the politics of the content of state or local drone
regulation. The second is the politics of federalism and federal preemption. Section XXX
discusses the politics of content.
The politics of federalism intersects with judicial appreciation of the need to give
greater room for state regulation of federal interests in areas where states traditionally
have exercised power.234 Most state and local lawmakers do not think much about
preemption. Even if they are lawyers and recall the concept from law school and the bar
exam, they are unlikely to have an appreciation of the analysis conducted in part XXX
and its conclusion. They likely, however, have a general understanding that some
matters are mostly federal and some are mostly local.
When they think of the subject as aviation regulation, they are likely to assume that it is
a matter for the federal government. When the subject is zoning, other land-use
regulations, nuisance, protection of personal privacy, and localized disorderly conduct,
they assume it's a matter for state or local regulation. Here is what is likely to happen:
A state legislature or a city council has proposed legislation on its agenda, sponsored by
one of its members in response to constituent pressure. The content of the measure may

234

See § XXX.
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restrict drones, or it may encourage their expanded use, depending on local politics.
The Maryland statute235 clearly is an example of the latter, but most of the others on the
list in § XXX are examples of the former. The legislative body schedules hearings, and at
some point, a hearing witness, another legislator, or staff counsel suggests that the
measure might be preempted by federal law. That will surely come as a surprise. "You
mean the federal government excludes us from aviation regulations all the way down to
one centimeter over my backyard?" someone may ask.
Then the battle is on. The FAA is extremely unlikely to accede to the proposition that it
has anything less than exclusive authority all the way to the ground.
1.
Not in my back yard
Ultimately, as section VV explains, the boundary between federal and state regulation
will be defined not by abstract legal principles, but by policy decisions made by federal,
state, and local legislators. Their policy decisions will, of course, be informed by politics
operating at their particular level of government. An axiom of political science is that
concentrated interests trump diffuse interests. Socially desirable projects such as cell
phone towers, wind turbine farms, waste disposal sites, and electricity infrastructure
"often succumb to a political process that yields to concentrated costs over diffuse
benefits."236 Organization matters, and it is not easy to organize.237
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Regulation at the federal level favors well-organized national interests, most of whom
are likely to be pro-drone: farmers,238 the press and media,239 realtors,240 electricity and
gas utilities,241 insurers,242 airlines,243 pilots,244 and railroads245. It will be easier for drone
manufacturers to exert political power at the national level rather than having to
develop a presence at the state and municipal level.
So does a role for states and municipalities mean more restrictions on desirable drone
use because of the NIMBY phenomenon? 246Answering that question requires analysis
of the political dynamics of local political decision-making, and that involves
assessment of whether pro-drone or anti-drone interests are likely to be concentrated or
diffuse.
Yale political science professor Robert Dahl, in his classic 1961 book, WHO GOVERNS?:
DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY, highlighted the role of local
governmental institutions as mediators among conflicting interests groups, some of
which had more power to influence the process than others.
“A political issue can hardly be said to exist unless and until it commands the attention
of a significant segment of the political stratum [the small segment of the population
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CITE – power of farmer lobby.
CITE – political power of press and media
CITE – power of realtors and developers
CITE – utility lobby
CITE insurance lobby
CITE – airline lobby
CITE ALPA and AOPA
CITE - RR lobby

"NIMBY, describes the situation where local citizens, organized community groups, and

officials who want to benefit from an “essential infrastructure,” such as wireless
telecommunication facilities, but do not want the infrastructure located in their particular
neighborhoods and communities." Camille Rorer, Can You See Me Now? The Struggle between
Cellular Towers and NIMBY, 19 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 213, 216-217 (2004-2005). See
Hannah Wiseman, Expending Regional Renewal Governance, 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 477, 483484 (2011) (arguing that fragmentation of governmental authority prevents efficient land use for
renewable energy; proposing regional structures).
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that is involved regularly in politics].”247 An issue may take root because members of
the political stratum get interested in it and influence other members to pay attention. It
also may take root when the apolitical stratum experiences a vaguely felt need and
members of the political stratum formulate ways for the need to be addressed by
political institutions.248 The vicissitudes of press and media attention drive awareness in
both strata. A highly publicized drone accident, or a rescue of a lost child enabled by
drone imagery has impace.
One cannot predict political behavior in a particular unit of government without
sophisticated public opinion polling of the population of that particular unit. Even then,
predictions based on poll results are notoriously unreliable when political opinion is
rapidly changing or when a particular issue is not very firmly in the public
consciousness. Still, national polling suggests that the public attitude toward drones is
unfavorable,249 likely fueled by an perception that civilian drones resemble military
drones used in combat by the armed services and intelligence agencies– Predators and
Reapers with thousands of pounds flying out of sight, at thousands of feet above the
ground, and loitering for many hours to spy on or launch missiles at those below.
Over time, the wider use of civilian microdrones will alter the public perception, but for
now, the likelihood is great that negative public attitude, reinforced by the NIMBY
phenomenon, will make state and local legislative bodies instinctively hostile to
widespread use of microdrones. In May, 2015, for examples the Commissioners of the
Chicago Park District had on their agenda a measure to prohibit drones from flying in
Chicago's extensive public park system unless the operator had a permit. 250 No
mechanism was in place for obtaining a permit. The poorly drafted, one-page measure
contained numerous errors about the FAA’s position on local regulation of drones. It
was withdrawn from the agenda pending reconsideration at another meeting after
model aircraft enthusiasts protested.

Dahl at 92 (explaining crystallization of political issues).
Id.
249 Alwyn Scott, Americans OK with police drones - private ownership, not so much: Poll, Reuters, Feb. 5,
2015 (reporting that 42% of 2,000 respondents opposed private ownership and operation of drones. but
62% support police use for crimefighting).
250 https://chicagoparkdistrict.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2283879&GUID=C26DC8E7-CAA444B1-A9ED-E275409C6D92
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248
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There will be exceptions of course. In some communities, drone proponents will be well
organized and influential. Realtors, 251 construction firms, and utilities, are alert and
have drones high enough on their agendas that they are willing to make the effort. In
some rural communities, agricultural interests that want to use drones will be
influential. In most cases, however, it is more likely that concentrated opposition will
trump diffuse supporters who don't know about the initiative or who don't want to go
to the trouble of opposing it.
2.

Intellectual capital

Eighty years ago, Justice Brandeis famously observed that the genius of the federal
structure of the United States is that states can serve as laboratories within which
different regulatory approaches can be tried out. 252 Moreover, having different local
regulations has its merits. For example, each region has its own environmental
characteristics (weather and terrain) that rational drone rules should take into account.
Drone operations in rural, compared with urban, environments differ, along with the
risks they pose.
The agenda of the laboratories, however, is not determines by an intellectual
exploration of facts and the public interest. It is determined by politics. But politics
translates into policy only when intellectual capital has linked amorphous public
desired to concrete legislative or regulatory language.253

251

Realtors are well represented on zoning bodies. Accordingly their interest in using

drones to market listed properties is concentrated relative to that of neighbors who may
oppose drone operations for this purpose. But see Jerry L. Anderson & Erin Sass, Is the
Wheel Unbalanced? A Study of Bias on Zoning Boards, 36 Urb. Law. 447 (2004)
(reporting on survey of members of Iowa zoning boards, data from which mostly
refuted hypothesis of pro-development bias).
"Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.
This Court has the power to prevent an experiment." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (invalidating, as violative of substantive due process, state law
restricting entry into ice business).
253 CITE role of intellectual capital in translating political desire into legislation.
252
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Drone regulation is not like occupational safety and health, or employment
discrimination, however, where many states had mature, effective programs before the
national program was crafted. Instead, virtually all of the intellectual capital with
respect to drone regulation has been developed focused on the premise that drones
would be regulated nationally.
It is completely different with respect to drone regulation. Few states or municipalities
have given any serious thought to how drones should be regulated. Few interest groups
have focused on drafting desirable state and local regulations. Most of the bills
proposed have been impulsive, superficial, and motivated by ill-conceived public
perceptions of the realities of drone flight.
On a relatively new issue like drones, local decision-makers are buffeted by public
outcries animated by urban myth and overblown anecdotes about what might happen.
They lack firm intellectual or political anchors to resist or to shape public opinion, so
they just go with the flow.
State and local legislators are not irresponsible; they just lack resources to find out what
the facts are. Interest groups provide essential technical support and intellectual capital
to higher-level legislative bodies and forge long-standing relationships involving trust
with the ample committee and personal staffs that support the United States Congress.
Interest groups frequently are impotent at lower levels of government, however,
because they lack the resources to interact effectively with legislators, who often are
part time, and have a little if any staff support.

VI.

Plan for the future

Drone regulation at the state—and, especially, at the local level—will result in
dramatically different regulatory regimes across the country. Would that be a bad thing,
either because of lack of uniformity, or because local regulation would bias decisionmaking? In addition to encouraging safety of air commerce, the FAA Administrator has
a statutory duty to "encourage the development of civil aeronautics."254 It is thus

49 U.S.C. § 40104. See also 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)(3) ("[FAA Administrator shall consider] encouraging
and developing civil aeronautics, including new aviation technology"); 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (c)(2) "[FAA
Administrator shall consider] the public right of freedom of transit through the navigable airspace").
254
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appropriate for the FAA, not only to assure that state and local regulation does not
interfere with its safety mandate, but also to assure that state and local regulations does
not stifle innovation and the development of commercial drone markets.
In considerable measure, the motivation for the proposal is to give the FAA and the
Congress a way to respond to state and local political pressure to allow states and
municipalities to regulate drones. Adoption of the proposal is far better for air
commerce, the national airspace system, and local democracy than a shoving match
among different levels of government, inevitable resulting in an outbreak of
uncoordinated litigation in state and federal court.
1.

Default: federal regulation and preemption

Default regulation for drones would comprise FAA regulations for DROP qualification,
vehicle capabilities, and operating rules. State and local desire to play a role would be
accommodated by a petition process. A state or municipality (authorized by state law)
could petition the FAA to regulate drones in certain airspace. The FAA would be
required to grant the petition so long as it shows that the proposed state regulation
involves matters traditionally of concern to the states, does not interfere with effective
operation of the national airspace system including, now, drone integration into it, does
not interfere with the economies of scale necessary to allow drone commerce to develop
in an unfettered market, and performance rather than technical engineering standards.
The four criteria are factors to be considered collectively; not elements. They also are
interrelated.
In effect, the regulatory regime would be an inversion of the state of affairs in mid 2015,
when the default is a prohibition, and commercial operators must petition to fly. Under
the proposal, the default would be permission to fly with units of state and local
government empowered to petition to limit it.
This arrangement could be authorized by statute, or it could be implemented under
existing statutory authority. The FAA already has authority to decide when to regulate
and went to stay its hand, and it also has authority to delegate its regulatory
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responsibility to others.255 For the most part delegation now involves shifting authority
to private persons, but there is no reason that the authority to delegate explodes
delegation to state and local governmental authorities. Moreover, the FAA has, and
frequently exercises, the authority to leave certain areas within the scope of its statutory
authority unregulated. Model aircraft operations are an obvious example, at least before
the 2012 statute withdrew FAA authority over the subject. Commercial aircraft airstairs
are another example, to borrow from the caselaw.
In effect, under the proposal, the FAA would say two things: first, we delegate our
authority to you in the space and to the extent that you propose, and second, we
withhold our authority to impose our own rules in the space and to the extent that you
propose.
The concept could be implemented in the final rule for microdrones, but it is not a
concept that was disclosed in the proposed rule, and therefore it has not received the
public comment the Administrative Procedure Act envisions.256 If it is deferred, the
federal government will have a considerable head start in regulating microdrones –
exactly the opposite of the experience with occupational safety and health and
employment discrimination regulation. That is not necessarily a bad thing, however.
The initial increment of federal regulation could produce data about and what does and
does not work, where state supplementation of the regulatory framework is most
desirable.
The default position, of federal regulation, while leaving the initiative to states and
municipalities to pose exactly what they want to regulate is that the Congress of the
FAA need not make guesses as to what is well-suited for state and local regulation and
what will satisfy state and local desires.
If the state wants to exclude drones from certain areas of geography, it can propose to
do so.

See 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d) (authorizing FAA Administrator to delegate "examination, testing, and
inspection necessary to issue a certificate under this chapter); 14 C.F.R. § 183.1 (summarizing delegation
of authority for issuing airman, operating, and aircraft certificates).
256 5 U.S.C. § 553.
255
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2.

FAA authority to approve a state plan, meeting certain criteria
a)

Unusual local interest

The first criterion would build on doctrine Commerce-Clause and federal-preemption
analysis that allows states a wider ambit of regulatory authority alongside or instead of
the federal government in areas traditionally with the state police power: land-use
regulations, personal privacy, and other areas of common law torts. A state petition that
imposes insurance requirements or tort rules for imposing liability arising from drone
accidents would be viewed favorably under this criterion.
A petition that addresses traffic separation or drop qualification or vehicle standard
would not.
b)

Non-interference with NAS

The second criterion involves assessing the state proposal in terms of its effect on the
efficient and safe operation of the national airspace system. A state proposal to exclude
drones from the airspace below to treetop and powerline level over private property
without permission would be viewed favorably under this criterion because it would
have little effect on national airspace system operations and on most legitimate drone
flight; indeed it's not clear that anyone is permitted to fly a manned aircraft or a drone
below treetop and powerline level about private property under existing if FARs, under
the NPRM, or under the section 333 exemptions.
On the other hand, a blanket ban on drones over the entire territory of a municipality
would interfere with the efficient and safe operation of the national airspace system,
given that the Congress has declared that commercial drone operations are a part of the
national airspace system, subject only to compliance with the FAA rules to ensure safe
integration.
c)

No adverse effect on national and international economies

of scale
The third criterion would require a showing by the state that its rules can be
accommodated without commercial drone operators having to have separate business
plans and operating programs for each local area in the United States. It also could be
heightened by showing that a state or local government proposes to adopt uniform or
model rules proposed by an entity like the uniform commissioners on national state
laws, the National Association of attorneys general, or some private group. Satisfaction
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of this criterion also would exist if a petitioner shows that compliance with the rules
impinges only slightly on likely commercial drone operations. Restricting low-level
flight over backyards it is an example of where impingement is low. Exposing certain
purposes such as harassment to after-the-fact liability would be another example.
On the other hand, a state or municipal regulatory regime that limits the kinds of
vehicles that can be flown would be suspect under this criterion. It would have the
effect of requiring drone operators with more than a local footprint to select their fleets
so as to accommodate a patchwork quilt of potentially inconsistent vehicle
requirements. Local imposition of DROP and other crew member qualification
requirements would be suspect for the same reason. Any system that requires advance
approval of drone flight would be inconsistent with this criterion because it would
ratchet up the transaction costs to know what the advance approval requirements are
and to alter operations to comply with them. Advance approval for specific flights
would be considerably worse in this regard than blanket approval for flights during a
defined period of time, such as a year.
d)

Plausible risk basis and performance orientation

The fourth criterion is closely related to the first. The risks that are petitioner identifies
should be explicitly, and logically linked to the interests it cites under the first criterion.
The analysis would resemble that used in 14th Amendment due process analysis to
demonstrate a nexus between limitations on human activity and legitimate state
interests.
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